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COPYRIGHT DEPARTURES: THE FALL OF THE LAST
IMPERIAL COPYRIGHT DOMINION AND THE
CASE OF FAIR USE
Lior Zemer*
INTRODUCTION
The contemporary history of copyright tells us many stories. Eco-
nomic and cultural motivations should, we are often told, direct us to
develop these stories by examining basic normative questions that pri-
marily debate the entitlement structure of copyright,' revisit its basic
ideological framework 2 and its incentive structure,3 understand the
symbiotic relationship between copyright and technology4 and be-
* Lecturer in Law, Radzyner School of Law, Interdisciplinary Centre Herzliya, Israel. I
would like to thank Leslie Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, Guy Pessach, Tony Greenman, Miriam Bitton,
and Irena Zolotova for their comments on earlier drafts. I would also like to thank Ortal
Tzarfati-Bela, Aviv Gaon, and Amir Vitale for their excellent research assistance.
1. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING MORAL
RIGirs LAW FOR THE UNITED STATEs (2010) (arguing that the present entitlement structure in
U.S. copyright law should be revised in a way that more seriously includes moral rights as an
integral part of this structure); see also Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual
Property? A Classical Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455 (2010)
(discussing the extent to which a unified set of principles applies to both tangible and intangible
property); Jeremy Phillips, Authorship, Ownership, Wikiship: Copyright in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAc. 788 (2008) (showing how recent technological developments
destabilize basic ideas of ownership and rights).
2. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L.
REv. 809 (2010) (examining intellectual property law's emerging role as a modern form of sump-
tuary law); Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal
Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186 (2008) (challenging the prevailing views
on the historical evolution of authorship); Madhavi Sunder, IP', 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 332
(2006) ("A cultural theory of intellectual property ... views intellectual property ... within a
context of cultural development and social movements . . . ."); Rebecca Tushnet, Economics of
Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513 (2009) (arguing
that the motivation to create is not necessarily due to economic incentives, but also represents
social desire to create).
3. See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 1569 (2009) (discussing whether unforeseeable benefits conferred by copyright are unnec-
essary from an incentive-based theory).
4. See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren, Tailoring Copyright to Social Production, 12 THEORETICAL IN-
OUIRIEs L. 309 (2011) (analyzing the social dimension of content production and its conse-
quences for the governance of content in the social web); Ben Depoorter, Technology and
Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on Copyright Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1831 (2009) (examining
the consequences of uncertainty and legal delay in the intersection between technology and
copyright).
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tween copyright and free speech,5 identify copyright's inherent para-
doxes, 6 urge us to revisit and unbundle its basic principles,7 and
inquire into the massive efforts to harmonize copyright standards and
norms.8 We tend to follow this telling, neglecting others and losing
sight of the advantages in interpreting modern copyright from other
less cultivated argumentative routes. One of these routes is the view
of modern copyright as a historical process, examining its transforma-
tion into an established area of law.
Inquiries into historical moments in the progressive evolution of
copyright can guide our attempts to restructure the entitlement edifice
in copyright, especially in light of announcements that "old-fashioned
copyright" no longer exists,9 that "copyright law is in the midst of a
revolutionary change,"10 that "[c]opyright is dead,"" or more gener-
ally, that the institution of intellectual property is "in intellectual cri-
Sis," 12 that "[i]ntellectual property has come of age,"13 and that in
recent decades "intellectual property law becomes literally a question
of life or death."14 In What is History?, Edward Carr wrote that "man
is capable of profiting . . . by the experience of his predecessors, and
that progress in history, unlike evolution in nature, rests on the trans-
mission of acquired assets. These assets include both the material pos-
5. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999) (proposing a First Amendment
basis for a user's right of access to the public domain); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How
Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 587 (2004)
("Courts should recognize that various kinds of copying . . . promote free speech.").
6. See generally NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT's PARADOX (2008).
7. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Philip J. Weiser, Beyond Fair Use, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
91, 93 (2010) ("[T]he golden era of fair use-if one ever existed-ended about a decade ago
. . . ."); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2537 (2009)
(claiming that fair use cases tend to fall into "policy-relevant clusters"); Brad Sherman, What Is a
Copyright Work?, 12 THEORETICAL INOUIRIEs L. 99 (2011) (discussing how the work is con-
figured in Anglo-Australian copyright law).
8. This process of harmonization includes efforts by the international community to establish
multilateral treaties and conventions. Many have criticized the nature of these efforts due to the
many attempts to unilaterally transplant Western standards in less developed legal traditions.
See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual Property
Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1.
9. David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1385, 1420 (1995).
10. Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 337 (2002).
11. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REv. 813, 814 (2001); see also Robert C. Den-
icola, Mostly Dead? Copyright Law in the New Millennium, 47 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 193
(2000).
12. David Vaver, Patently Absurd, 13 OxFoRn TODAY, no.1, 2000, at 21, 21-22.
13. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1031,
1075 (2005).
14. Sunder, supra note 2, at 261.
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sessions and the capacity to master, transform, and utilize one's
environment."15 Understanding progressive historical processes that
shaped modern copyright and the ways in which these processes were
utilized and mastered imparts invaluable intellectual assets. 16 They
have the capacity to make us rethink the wisdom behind the core prin-
ciples and doctrinal standards that control the allocation of rights and
duties in contemporary copyright.17
One of these historical periods that had a decisive effect on the de-
velopment of Western conceptions of copyright and their global diffu-
sion is the period between the years 1860 and 1911 in the British
Empire and its colonial offshoots. During this period, copyright be-
came a recognized part of the legal tradition; it was consolidated, en-
trenched, and fossilized.' 8 The process of elevating copyright to the
status of a recognized legal discipline culminated at a statutory level
with the passage of the British Copyright Act of 1911.19 The latter
15. EDWARD HALLETT CARR, WHAT Is HISTORY? 155-56 (1961).
16. On this issue see, for example, Michael D. Birnhack, The Idea of Progress in Copyright
Law, 1 BuFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 3 (2001) (observing that an examination of the idea of progress
in copyright explains the way copyright principles operate and captures the regulatory concep-
tion of copyright).
17. The historical evolution of copyright has attracted scholars from formidable polish. See,
e.g., AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, SEVEN LECTURES ON THE LAW AND HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN
BOOKS (1899); RONAN DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO COPY: CHARTING THE
MOVEMENT OF COPYRIGHT LAW IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1695-1775) (2004); BEN-
JAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 1-25 (1966); JOSEPH LOEWENSTEIN, THE
AUTHOR'S DUE: PRINTING AND THE PREHISTORY OF COPYRIGHT (2002); MARK ROSE, Au-
THORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993); THOMAS EDWARD SCRUT-rON,
THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 73-95 (4th ed. 1903); BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAK-
ING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE, 1760-1911 (1999);
MARTHA WOODMANSEE, THE AUTHOR, ART, AND THE MARKET: REREADING THE HISTORY OF
AESTHETICS (1994); Bracha, supra note 2, at 186; Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete His-
toriographies: Of Piracy, Propertization, and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993 (2006)
(discussing incomplete claims about the historical evolution of key concepts in copyright); Jus-
tine Pila, 'Law and the Victorians: Intellectual Property,' J. LEGAL HiST. (forthcoming 2011);
Catherine Seville, Copyright, in 6 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE BOOK IN BRITAIN 214
(David McKitterick ed., 2009).
18. As Sherman and Bently put it, the period between 1860 and 1911 was "a time in which
gradually, haphazardly and following no particular logic, the categories of modern intellectual
property came to take on an institutional reality." SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra note 17, at 129.
19. Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46 (Eng.) [hereinafter the 1911 Act]. Until the
passage of the 1911 Act, copyright law was incomplete and often obscure and
governed by no fewer than twenty-two Acts of Parliament, passed at different times
between 1735 and 1906; and to these should be added a mass of Colonial legislation,
frequently following blindly the worst precedents of English law . .. . The new Copy-
right Bill [eventually becoming the 1911 Act] makes a clean sweep of all these enact-
ments and proposes to set up in their place a homogenous code of Copyright Law,
drafted on the whole on sound and generous lines.
Copyright Law Reform, 216 Q. REV. 483, 489 (1910); see also SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra note
17, at 95-193. It should be noted that each of the twenty-two Acts contributed something to the
1054 DEPA UL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1051
had become an expression of modern copyright law throughout the
former British Empire.
Although most former colonies and other governed parts of the
British Empire subsequently enacted their own copyright laws, for the
most part, new copyright laws were designed with the imperial model
of 1911 as the foundational source. 20 The legal transplantation of im-
perial laws onto the colonies' legal system was a common practice.
Even after the colonies earned their independence, many of the intel-
lectual property laws of former controlling powers survived state suc-
cession and remained valid for decades. 21 The state of copyright law
in Israel is a prime example of this post-independence practice. It
took almost a full century until the State of Israel formally repealed
the imperial model.22 Until 2007, Israel had remained the last jurisdic-
tion of the former dominions of the British Empire to operate under
enactment of the 1911 Act. For example, the 1862 Fine Art Copyright Act-an Act that was
designed to afford protection to painters and photographers-was "another and most important
step towards the completion and perfection of the series of parliamentary enactments ... of Art
Copyright." EMANUEL M. UNDERDOWN, THE LAW OF ART COPYRIGHT: THE ENGRAVING,
SCULPTURE AND DESIGNS ACTs, THE INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT Acr, AND THE ART Copy-
RIGHT Acr, 1862, at 5 (1863).
20. The 1911 imperial model had great influence on the development of modern copyright
laws in the former British colonies, such as Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, New Zealand, and
South Africa. This influence, however, was not passively received. A recent inquiry into the
legislative reforms in these ex-colonies shows that they actively challenged the imperial copy-
right model of 1911. See Robert Burrell, Copyright Reform in the Early Twentieth Century: The
View from Australia, 27 J. LEGAL HisT. 239 (2006).
21. For example,
Until 1989, Lesotho operated under the Patents, Trade Marks and Designs Protection
Proclamation of 1919, a United Kingdom instrument. Mauritius, a former French col-
ony, continued to operate under its Trade Marks Act (1868) and Patents Act (1975) for
over twenty years after obtaining independence in 1968. Swaziland also inherited its IP
regime "as a colonial legacy." The same is true with respect to other laws and
institutions.
Ruth L. Okediji, The International Relations of Intellectual Property: Narratives of Developing
Country Participation in the Global Intellectual Property System, 7 SING. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 315,
335 n.73 (2003) (citations omitted).
22. The fact that Palestine was a mandate within the British Empire, not a colony, influenced
the development of its legal system. Imperialism, Osterhammel writes, is more comprehensive
than colonialism. JORGEN OSTERHAMMEL, COLONIALISM: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 16-21
(Shelly L. Frisch trans., 1997). While the latter refers to the domination of an indigenous major-
ity by a minority of foreign invaders, the former encompasses all aspects that relate to the estab-
lishment of transcolonial empires and their enforcement of their laws and political interests. Id.;
see also Lionel Bently, The "Extraordinary Multiplicity" of Intellectual Property Laws in the Brit-
ish Colonies in the Nineteenth Century, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIEs L. 161 (2011) (showing the
lack of apparent imperial strategy as to the development of intellectual property laws in Britain
and the colonies in the nineteenth century).
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the imperial model. The Copyright Act of 200723 ended the hegem-
ony of the British Copyright Act of 1911 and the 1924 Copyright Ordi-
nance, which Israel inherited from the British Mandate. 24 The many
changes introduced by the 1911 Act created a new copyright reality
for rightholders, users, the industry, and the public.
This Article is an endeavor in the intellectual history of copyright.
No inquiry into the historical development of a legal doctrine can con-
fine itself solely to the enacted laws. Paul Goldstein recently wrote
that "[i]ntellectual property law's divide between private property and
the public domain is a legal artifact, not a natural phenomenon. The
line shifts not only with the views of particular judges but also with
national boundaries and with cultural attitudes." 25 That is, in order to
understand the actual politics of copyright change, it will not suffice to
know the laws and decisions that guide authors and users in their daily
life as either members of the creative community or consumers of the
latter's expressive commodities. Pure law and cultural ideology must
be examined together. This Article proceeds accordingly. It examines
both the law and ideology of copyright change in Israel before it
draws doctrinal and other normative payoffs. It approaches this task
by addressing the historical evolution of copyright in Israel from
before the inception of the state. It takes fair use as a doctrinal exem-
plar reflecting the system's ideological spirit.26
This Article has four main objectives. First, it aims to explore key
events in the historical process of copyright law reform in Israel. Sec-
23. Copyright Act 2007, 5768-2007, 2007 LSI 34 (Isr.). The 2007 Copyright Act entered into
force on May 25, 2008. A translated version can be found at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/
text.jsp?filejid=132095.
24. The 1911 Copyright Act was applied to mandatory Palestine via the King's Order in Coun-
cil on the Copyright Act, 1911 (Extension to Palestine), 1924 L.P. Vol. C (H) 2661, (E) 2499
(1911) (Eng.). In 1924, the 1911 Act was amended via the Copyright Ordinance, 1924 Official
Gazette 623 [1924] (Eng.) [hereinafter the 1924 Ordinance].
25. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT's HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKE-
Box 10 (rev. ed. 2003).
26. This Article provides a window into a copyright jurisdiction that has not received much
scholarly attention, and although Israel attracts contemporary scholarly debates on various is-
sues, intellectual property is not one of them. Israel's enactment of the most recent copyright
law, which emancipates it from its historical chains to the British Imperial Copyright Act, is a
timely occasion for this inquiry. Recent research on Israeli law includes, for example, Daphna
Kapeliuk, The Limits of Judicial Discretion: Emotive Dispositions of Israeli Courts in Implement-
ing the New York Convention, 24 OHIo ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 291 (2009); Pnina Lahav, Ameri-
can Moment[s]: When, How, and Why Did Israeli Law Faculties Come to Resemble Elite U.S.
Law Schools?, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 653 (2009); Revital Sela-Shayovitz, Social Control
in the Face of Security and Minority Threats, 49 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 772 (2009); Moshe Zaki,
The Field of Forensic Psychology in Israel-The State of the Discipline, 28 MED. & L. 689 (2009);
Binyamin Blum, Note, Doctrines Without Borders: The "New" Israeli Exclusionary Rule and the
Dangers of Legal Transplantation, 60 STAN. L. REv. 2131 (2008).
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ond, taking fair use as its organizing principle, it strives to show how
the reform of this delicate legal doctrine can serve as a defining histor-
ical moment in copyright progress. Third, it uses the Israeli experi-
ence of fair use transplantation to highlight its general ideological and
legal concerns and to argue that fair use systems should become the
norm and that the survival of copyright systems is dependent on the
ability to keep redefining the boundaries of fair use rather than de-
claring it obsolete. Fourth, this Article strives to show that compara-
tive inquiries into copyright reforms are of notable value in a global
polity where trade and commerce have internationalized.
As a way to access these objectives, this Article proceeds in eleven
parts. Following the introductory part, Parts II and III present the
foreground and discuss the historical and ideological evolution of cop-
yright law in Israel.27 Part IV shows why fair use reform is at a defin-
ing moment in copyright development.28 Parts V and VI examine the
old fair dealing and the new fair use as transplanted in Israeli copy-
right law. 2 9 Core social changes to the perceptions of fair uses are the
theme of Parts VII and VIII.30 Prior to the concluding Part, Parts IX
and X explore and evaluate the role of courts, domestically and glob-
ally, in the design of contemporary models of fair use.31 Part XI con-
cludes by highlighting the normative findings emerging from this
inquiry.32
II. HISTORIOGRAPHY
The history of copyright in Israel is an exercise in the study of the
dynamics and evolution of imperial legal models and legal transplants
in global legal cultures. It is an example of how "[w]orldwide models
define and legitimate agendas for local action, shaping the structures
and policies of nation-states and other national and local actors in vir-
tually all of the domains of rationalized social life." 33 Copyright law in
Israel had long waited for local action. As a legal field that affects our
daily social life, copyright in Israel required rationalization via legal
reform, which necessitated departure from obsolete imperial legal
conceptions.34 Drawing the timeline in which Israeli copyright law has
27. See infra notes 33-94 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 95-128 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 129-85 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 186-244 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 245-361 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 362-63 and accompanying text.
33. John W. Meyer et al., World Society and the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. Soc. 144, 145 (1997).
34. On the history of Israeli law, see generally Assaf Likhovski, Ron Harris & Sandy Kedar,
Between Law and History: On the Historiography of Israeli Law, 26 TEL Aviv U. L. REV. 351
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evolved is a multilayered task. It moves from the Ottoman Empire to
the British Civil Administration of 1920, the introduction of the Impe-
rial Copyright Act of 1911 alongside the 1924 Ordinance into the laws
of Mandate Palestine, the inception of the State of Israel in 1948, and
the changes made by the Knesset culminating with the 2007 Act.35
Once this chain of historical evolution is explained, it will prove a
source for comparative copyright inquiries, highlighting the challenges
faced by ex-colonies when legal reforms become acute.3 6
A. Copyright in Pre-Mandate Palestine
Prior to the inception of the State of Israel in 1948, intellectual
property was not a developed field of law in the region. However,
since "[i]ntellectual property law was not merely an incidental part of
the colonial legal apparatus, but a central technique in the commercial
superiority"37 of imperial powers, it was not totally ignored. The legal
life of copyright in pre-mandate Palestine begins with the Author's
Rights Act of 1910 introduced by the Ottoman Empire. Although the
Mejelle-the Ottoman civil code promulgated in 1869-was silent re-
garding copyright, the 1910 Act brought to the region a law that en-
compasses some basic features familiar to contemporary copyright.
The Act covered, for example, protected subject matter such as liter-
ary, pictorial, and musical works,38 the exclusion of legislation from
protection,39 the requirement of formalities, registration, and de-
posit,40 and a thirty-year copyright duration after the death of the au-
(2002) (Heb.) (discussing the many advantages in historical inquiries into the evolution of Israeli
law), and THE HISTORY OF LAW IN A MULTI-CULTURAL SOCIETY: ISRAEL 1917-1967 (Ron Har-
ris et al. eds., 2002); Assaf Likhovski, Between a "Mandate" and a "Nation": On the Historical
Division of Israeli Law into Historical Periods, 29 HEB. U. L. REV. 689 (1998) (Heb.) (showing
that the legal history of Israel is best explained by reference to different periods). See also SUZIE
NAVOT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ISRAEL (2007); PUBLIc LAW IN ISRAEL (Itzhak Zamir & Allen
Zysblat eds., 1996).
Biographies written by prominent legal figures in Mandate Palestine greatly contribute to the
understanding of the legal reality during that period. See, e.g., NORMAN BENTWICH & HELEN
BENTWICH, MANDATE MEMORIEs: 1918-1948 (1965).
35. The Act contains seventy-eight provisions divided among eleven chapters.
36. I make no claim to present a complete and exhaustive survey of the historical evolution of
copyright in pre- and post-Mandate Palestine. For a comprehensive survey, see Michael D.
Birnhack, Hebrew Authors and English Copyright Law in Mandate Palestine, 12 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 201 (2011).
37. Okediji, supra note 21, at 324.
38. See Author's Rights Act of 1910, § 2, cited in Birnhack, supra note 36, at 205-06.
39. Id. § 8.
40. Id. §§ 4, 20-24.
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thor.41 The Ottoman Criminal Act 4 2 supplemented the 1910 Act by
creating separate criminal offenses in cases of authorial infringement.
The 1910 Act appears to have never been applied.43 It was only in
1930 that a copyright dispute was brought before a British judge, who
in turn claimed the case to be the first copyright case in Palestine.44
Indeed, the cultural scenery in the Yishuv-known as the Jewish Zi-
onist Community-between the years 1910 and 1935 was then making
its early steps towards what eventually became a vibrant and influen-
tial community.45 Zohar Shavit remarks that the British rule was re-
ceptive towards the development of a literary and cultural
environment and was supportive of the local community's efforts to
become an established cultural center "starting with the building pro-
cess of the new Jewish society and with the moving of literary centers
from parts of Europe to Palestine."46
B. Copyright in Post-Mandate Palestine
The British arrived in Israel in 1917 and departed thirty-one years
later. A military administration was established in the region after it
was conquered by the British Army in 1917. It was replaced by the
41. See id. § 6. The Act allowed a shorter period of protection of eighteen years to charts,
engravings, and maps on the death of the author. Id. § 7.
42. See § 241 of the Ottoman Penal Code:
As the person who prints or causes to be printed a book contrary to the privileges of
authors or makes or causes to be made a thing the manufacturing or doing of which has
been restricted to an individual or a company as a privilege will have committed a sort
of forgery ... and from those who import into the Ottoman Empire such as have been
printed or manufactured in this manner abroad . .. and those who knowingly sell such
printings or manufactures are punished by the taking of a fine....
43. See Birnhack, supra note 36, at 206.
44. CrimC 1844/29 Attorney General v. Guth (Jan. 9, 1930) (English Performing Rights Soci-
ety Archive), cited in Birnhack, supra note 36, at 220.
The first officially published copyright case was CA 66/32 The Palestine Telegraphic Agency v.
Adel Jaber [1933] 1 PLR 780 (Isr.). In that case the Supreme Court ruled on a dispute involving
publication of news by the Palestine Bulletin. The news was obtained from the Palestine Tele-
graphic Agency. The editorial staff of the former put the news "into the language and literary
style of that newspaper." Id. The appeal was dismissed holding that "[t]here is or may be copy-
right in the particular forms of language or modes of expression by which information is con-
veyed, and not the less so because the information may be with respect to the current events of
the day." Id. (quoting Walter v. Steinkopff (1892), 3 Ch. D. 495 (Eng.)). For further discussion
and examples of early copyright cases in Mandate Palestine, see Birnhack, supra note 36, at
219-23.
45. Birnhack shows that the legal field of copyright in Palestine could not properly address
copyright conflicts in the Yishuv during the 1920s. These, in many instances, were settled by
social norms. Birnhack, supra note 36, at 228-40.
46. Zohar Shavit, The Development of Literary Life in Eretz Israel, 29 LITERARY 13 (1979)
(Heb.) (translation by author). See also Zohar Shavit, The Crystallization of the Literary Centre
in Eretz Israel Alongside the Process of the Establishment of the Local Society, 16 CATEDRA 207
(1980) (Heb.).
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British Civil Administration in 1920.47 That copyright was not an
alien concept is evident in the High Commissioner's issuance of an
ordinance the same year declaring that, subject to certain changes,48
the Ottoman Author's Rights Act of 1910 was still a valid law.4 9
The immediate enactment of a copyright law prompted Michael
Birnhack to question the reasons behind it: "Why did the British enact
copyright law as early as August 1920, just a month after establishing
the civil administration, and then reenact it less than four years later?
Clearly, copyright was not the most urgent issue on the table of the
High Commissioner. Land and immigration were the burning issues
of the day."50 The reason, he writes, is two-fold:
The introduction of copyright law seems to have been the result of
two cumulative British interests. One was a general Imperial inter-
est in copyright law: the nature of copyright combined with the
then-emerging international scheme of the Berne Convention and
the interests of British authors and publishers. A second British
consideration was a specific interest in establishing a legal infra-
structure for commercial activities in Palestine.51
Indeed, the attention given to copyright in Palestine should not be
treated as a mere exercise of power for addressing the economic and
cultural interests of the local community only. Colonial powers were
not indifferent towards intellectual property laws. They were well
aware of their economic and political importance. Ruth Okediji put
this most eloquently:
The [early period of European trade relations with non-European
peoples] was characterized predominantly by the extension of intel-
lectual property laws to the colonies for purposes associated gener-
ally with the overarching colonial strategies of assimilation,
incorporation and control. It was also characterized by efforts to
secure national economic interests against other European coun-
tries in colonial territories. 52
In 1922, the Civil Administration was replaced by the British Man-
date pursuant to Article 22 of the Covenant of the 1919 League of
47. On the status of the law in early Mandate Palestine, see RONEN SHAMIR, THE COLONIES
OF LAW: COLONIALISM, ZIONISM AND LAw IN EARLY MANDATE PALESTINE (2000); Assaf
Likhovski, In Our Image: Colonial Discourse and the Anglicization of the Law of Mandatory
Palestine, 29 ISR. L. REV. 291 (1995).
48. For example, photographs and records had become a copyrightable subject matter, the
duration of copyright was extended to fifty years after the death of the author, and formalities
were cancelled. Copyright Ordinance, 1920, 172 Official Gazette 3 [1920].
49. Id.
50. See Birnhack, supra note 36, at 214.
51. Id. at 215. Great Britain ratified the Berne Convention on behalf of Palestine on March
21, 1924. Thorvald Solberg, The International Copyright Union, 36 YALE L.J. 68, 88 (1926).
52. Okediji, supra note 21, at 325.
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Nations. The King issued the Order-in-Council. 53 The 1910 Act and
the 1920 Ordinance continued in force until 1924, when the Copyright
Act of 1911 (Extension to Palestine) Order was passed.54 As the Offi-
cial Gazette of Palestine provides,
Whereas His Majesty, King George V, has been pleased, by and
with the advice of his Privy council, to order by and Order in Coun-
cil entitled the Copyright Act 1911 (Extension to Palestine) Order,
1924, that the Act of the Imperial Parliament, known as the Copy-
right Act 1911, shall extend to Palestine, subject to certain modifica-
tions in the order contained.55
Apart from the 1911 Act, copyright law in Mandate Palestine was
governed by the Copyright Ordinance of 1924.56 The Ordinance was
the engine behind copyright amendments.57 The 1911 Act and the
1924 Ordinance governed copyright in Israel until the passage of the
new 2007 Copyright Act (the 2007 Act), negotiated over the course of
three decades.58 Although amendments were made to the earlier
texts, they were sporadic at best.
The old law was enacted in an era when the movie industry was
making its early steps, the television was not yet invented, and video,
multimedia, file sharing, thumbnail photos, and Wikis were not even
conceived. Undoubtedly then, the enactment of the 2007 Act in Israel
53. See NORMAN BENTWICH, ENGLAND IN PALESTINE (1932); see also Norman Bentwich, The
Legal System of Palestine Under the Mandate, 2 MIDDLE EAST J. 33 (1948); JACOB REUVENI,
THE ADMINISTRATION OF PALESTINE UNDER THE BRITISH MANDATE 1920-1948: AN INSTITU-
TIONAL ANALYSIS (1993) (Heb.).
54. Norman Bentwich, The Legislation of Palestine, 1918-1925, 8 J. Comp. LEGIS. & INT'L L. 9,
12 (1926) ("The Law of Copyright has been more directly brought into conformity with the law
of the British Empire, because the Imperial Copyright Act itself has been applied in Palestine by
Order in Council.").
55. 1924 Ordinance, 114 Official Gazette 623 [19241 (signed by the High Commissioner
Herbet Samuel, April 23, 1924; published May 1, 1924). The Act itself, despite being proclaimed
in 1924, was officially published a decade later.
56. Id. The Ordinance dealt with importation of copyright works into Palestine (§ 2) and with
offenses and penalties in cases of copyright infringement (§ 3). The same official issue of the
Gazette also published the Patents and Designs Ordinance 1924, 114 Official Gazette 625-41
[1924].
57. 1924 Ordinance, 114 Official Gazette at 623, § 4 ("The Copyright Act 1911 shall be read as
modified or added to by this Ordinance.").
58. For a list of laws that regulate copyright, see Tony Greenman, Israel, in COPYRIGHT
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD § 20:2 (Silke von Lewinski ed., 2010). See also Joshua Weisman,
Israel, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE (Paul E. Geller ed., 2005).
Jewish law also serves as a source for interpretation and development of modern copyright
principles. In the Dead Sea Scrolls Case, Justice Tirkel referred to Jewish law in order to inter-
pret moral rights. CA 2790, 2811/93 Eisenman v. Qimron (Dead Sea Scrolls Case) 54(3) IsrSC
817 [2000] (Isr.). For a detailed study, see NACHUM RAKOVER, COPYRIGHT IN JEWISH LITER-
ARY SOURCES (1991) (Heb.); see also NEIL W. NETANEL & DAVID NIMMER, FROM MAIMONIDES
TO MICROSOFT: THE JEWISH LAW OF COPYRIGHT SINCE THE BIRTH OF PRINT (forthcoming
2011).
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was crucial to meet the needs of the creative, legal, and user commu-
nities, to adapt to technological changes, 59 and to conform to obliga-
tions under international copyright laws and other bilateral
agreements.60
The 1911 Act was ill-defined, unclear, and had been unable to pro-
vide coherent legal mechanisms. The original version of the Act was
subtle and ambiguous and included references to colonies and the
rights of universities and colleges that are mentioned in the British
Copyright Act of 1775. In the Hebrew-translated version, there were
several omissions that created a legal reality absent core copyright
principles. For example, the requirement of originality was omitted
from § 1 of the translated version.61 Since the inception of the State
of Israel, several changes were made to the Act. Still, until 2008, one
had to resort to the British version in order to understand some of the
principles in the translated version.
The 1924 Copyright Ordinance amended the 1911 Act. Until the
entry into force of the 2007 Act, changes to Israel's copyright law were
made via the 1924 Ordinance. For example, moral rights did not exist
under the 1911 Act but were added to the Ordinance, 62 and, while the
duration of copyrighted works in the 1911 Act was life plus fifty years,
the Ordinance imposed life plus seventy years, following the Euro-
pean Directive 63 and the U.S. Copyright Term Extension Act." Thus,
in order to get a complete vision of the state of copyright law in Israel,
the 1911 Act and the 1924 Ordinance had to be read in tandem. 65
With the enactment of the 2007 Act, copyright law in Israel, as Tony
Greenman remarks, "no longer mirrors British copyright law and has
59. On the challenges to copyright exceptions brought along by technological changes, see
generally ROBERT BURRELL & ALLISON COLEMAN, COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS: THE DIGITAL IM-
PAcr (2005).
60. Israel is a member of the majority of international treaties and conventions on intellectual
property. See Israel, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, http://www.wipo.int/
wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=IL (last visited Apr. 7, 2011).
61. The Supreme Court did not spare its criticism of the Act. See, e.g., CA 360/83 Strosky Ltd.
v. Glidat Vitman Ltd. 40(3) IsrSC 340, 346 [1985] (Isr.).
62. 1924 Ordinance, 114 Official Gazette at 623, § 4(a); Copyright Act 2007, Isr. 2199,
§§ 45-46 (Isr.). See also Dead Sea Scrolls Case 54(3) IsrSC at 817. On the economic and moral
rights of authors in Israel, see Tony Greenman, supra note 58, § 20:20, and 1 TONY GREENMAN,
COPYRIGHT, chs. 5 & 14 (2d ed. 2008) (Heb.). See also Joshua Weisman, The Personal Right
(Droit Moral) in Copyright Law, 7 BAR ILAN L. STUD. 51 (1989).
63. Council Directive 93/98/EEC, [1993] O.J. (L 290), art. 1(1) (harmonizing the term of pro-
tection of copyright and certain related rights).
64. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). See also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186 (2003). Cf. 1911 Act, 1 & 2 Geo 5, c. 46, § 3 (Eng.); 1924 Ordinance, 114 Official Gazette at
623, § 5(4); Copyright Act, 2007, LSI 2199 §§ 38-44 (Isr.).
65. See 1924 Ordinance, 114 Official Gazette at 623, § 8.
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some distinctively American, Continental European and local
flavors. "66
III. IDEOLOGY
Legislative departures from imperial and colonial laws cannot alone
refine a state's copyright patterns. Copyright in Israel not only de-
parted from the Imperial Copyright Act but also progressively re-
treated from certain aspects of copyright ethics that still dominate
copyright ideology in other legal traditions. This was made possible
by the courts' willingness to reconsider the philosophical wisdom be-
hind copyright and their frequent examination of a mix of theories in
their rulings. Wendy Gordon once wrote, "[D]etermining the relevant
calculus to accommodate the various goals is, at this stage of copy-
right's development, a difficult matter. This is not a sign of copyright's
immaturity as a discipline; virtually all legal doctrines contain a mix of
policies competing for strength." 67 As this Part shows, the aspiration
of Israeli courts to ethically align the local copyright agenda with pre-
66. Greenman, supra note 58, § 20:1. It should be noted, however, that the influence of Conti-
nental law on the 2007 Act is limited. The 2007 Act reassures that Israeli copyright law adheres
to the Anglo-American version of copyright. This tendency to avoid principles from the Conti-
nental approach was criticized by Joshua Weisman for creating an overly strong pro-user reality
under the 2007 Act. Joshua Weisman, Comparative Reading: The Copyright Act 2007, Continen-
tal Law and Common Law, in AUTHORING RIGHTS: READINGS IN COPYRIGHT LAw 69, 78
(Michael Birnhack & Guy Pessach eds., 2009) (Heb.). For example, he remarks that it was
wrong to follow the Anglo-American approach to moral rights. Id. Weisman argues that these
rights should last in perpetuity, as in France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece. Id. He writes,
[With regard to moral rights,] the Israeli legislature chose to follow the legal systems
that limit the duration of these rights. This is another unfortunate example of the way
the Israeli Act followed the Anglo-Saxon approach and another example of the new
Act's tendency to limit the rights of authors as opposed to the situation in many other
countries.
Id. (translation by author).
It is not only the Israeli Act that is an example of a legislative mosaic. The originator of Israeli
copyright law provides another example of the special affection for borrowing from other juris-
dictions. Sherman and Bently explain,
Translations of non-English materials and regular reports from foreign envoys meant
that Board of Trade and Parliament as well as commentators and critics more generally
had access to a wide variety of materials ranging from updates on Saxon copyright law,
Prussian patent applications and the nature of the Belgian textile industry through to
information on the book-buying habits of the residents of St Petersburg and a transla-
tion of Kant's Was ist ein Buch? The cross-fertilisation was reinforced by the fact that
foreign parties were often involved in petitioning the UK parliament for changes in
British Law.
SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra note 17, at 212-13 (footnotes omitted).
67. Wendy J. Gordon, Copyright Norms and the Problem of Private Censorship, in COPY-
RIGHT AND FREE SPEECH: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSES 67, 85 (Jonathan
Griffiths & Uma Suthersanen eds., 2005).
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vailing contemporary visions of copyright comes in the guise of such
competing policies.
The natural property right argument, associated with John Locke's
philosophy of property,68 holds that an author enjoys an exclusive nat-
ural property right in the labor of his hands and expression of his tal-
ent until the right begins to injure society or its members.69 Landmark
U.S. and British cases have applied the Lockean rationale of labor,
developing the rule of as you sow, so shall you reap.70 Similarly, in
Geva v. Walt Disney Co.,71 discussing whether a cartoonist can use
Disney's Donald Duck animated figure in a book, the Israeli Supreme
Court held that the goal of copyright law is not overtly utilitarian, but
rather to reward the author for the laborious efforts he expends and
the mental talent he invests in the production of creative works. More
recently, two cases from the Supreme Courts of Israel and Canada
explicitly referred to Locke's labor theory while discussing the public
interest in intellectual property. 72 Both cases show the relevancy of
the Lockean theory in today's copyright jurisprudence.
In recent years, however, the attractiveness and centrality of Lock-
ean justifications to copyright have declined. Courts in several juris-
dictions have rejected it as a sufficient justification to copyright and
have endorsed the utilitarian approach associated with Jeremy Ben-
tham's philosophy.73 In the landmark U.S. case of Feist Publications
v. Rural Telephone Service Co., the Supreme Court held that "[t]he
primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labors of authors,
but '[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.' To this
68. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 2d ed. 1967) (1690); see also PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
41-72 (1996); Abraham Drassinower, A Rights-Based View of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in
Copyright Law, 16 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 3 (2003); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-
Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE
L.J. 1533 (1993); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988);
Lior Zemer, The Making of a New Copyright Lockean, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 891 (2006).
69. The Lockean labor theory is a union of two propositions. First, that everyone has a natu-
ral property right in his own "person" and in the labor of his body. Second, that property rights
are limited ab initio by specific social limitations. These limitations are the "no-spoliation" con-
dition and the "sufficiency condition"-known as the Proviso. While the former respects the
rule that "[n]othing was made by God for Man to spoil or destroy," the latter stipulates that man
has a right to appropriate from the common as long as "enough, and as good [is] left in common
for others." LOCKE, supra note 68, §§ 27, 31.
70. See, e.g., Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985); Int'l News Serv. v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918). British cases require sufficient "labour, skill and
capital." See Macmillan v. Cooper (1923) 93 LJPC 113, 117 (Lord Atkinson) (Eng.).
71. PLA 2687/92 Geva v. Walt Disney Co. 48(1) IsrSC 251 [1993] (Isr.).
72. See PLA 8483/02 Aloniel Ltd. v. Ariel McDonald IsrSC 314 [2004] (Isr.); CCH Canadian
Ltd. v. Law Soc'y of Upper Can. [2004] S.C.R. 339 (Can.).
73. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, A MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1843).
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end, copyright assures authors the right to their original expression
.... "74 Also, in the recent Canadian case of CCH Canadian v. Law
Society of Upper Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada held that la-
bor cannot alone merit property protection in authorial works.75
Similarly, the Israeli Supreme Court, in Interlego A/S v. Exin-Line
Bros. SA, 76 departed from the British-style labor justification. Re-
jecting its own earlier argument developed in Geva,77 the court sub-
scribed to the view that the labor approach inappropriately places the
author, instead of the public, at the center of the copyright ownership
dilemma. In this landmark copyright case, the court was asked to re-
view copyright protection for functional items (Lego parts). Focusing
on the goal of copyright in Israel, former President Meir Shamgar re-
jected the natural property right justification and the "sweat of the
brow" argument and emphasized the utilitarian nature of Israeli copy-
right: "A copyright holder enriches society's creative realm. The goal
of copyright is to provide incentives for creative activities. [Copy-
right] laws are tools that provide private protection for public goods
. .. ."78 Therefore, the goal of these laws is "to encourage the diversity
of expressions and knowledge and to enrich the pool of expres-
sions."79 Subsequent cases followed suit. For example, in the City of
Holon v. NMC Music, 80 the Israeli Supreme Court examined whether
the lending of CDs in public libraries constitutes fair dealing. Finding
that a public library does not infringe copyright when lending CDs for
non-commercial use, Justice Levin reiterated that the justificatory ba-
sis for copyright is utilitarian: "In Anglo-American law the basic justi-
fication for copyright is the need to provide an incentive for authors in
order to maximise public access to the works created. The ideology of
copyright law in Israel is this ideology."81 Following these rulings,
courts in Israel remain, in most cases, steadfast to utilitarian justifica-
tions to copyright. They adopted the Benthamite utilitarian rationale
74. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8).
75. See CCH Canadian S.C.R. at 339.
76. CA 513/89 Interlego A/S v. Exin-Line Bros. SA 48(4) IsrSC 133, 161 [1994] (Isr.).
77. PLA 2687/92 Geva v. Walt Disney Co. 48(1) IsrSC 251 [1993] (Isr.).
78. Interlego 48(4) IsrSC at 161.
79. Id.; see also Guy Pessach, Copyright in the Supreme Court. Trends, Considerations and a
Look Towards the "Information Age," 2002 ALEY MISHPAT 347 (Heb.).
80. CA 326/00 City of Holon v. NMC Music 57(3) IsrSC 658 [2003] (Isr.).
81. Id.; see also CA Football Ass'n Premier League Ltd. v. Amoat'za Lehesder Ha'himurim
Basport 08(3) IsrSC 938 [2008] (Isr.).
It should be noted, however, that natural right justifications did not completely disappear after
Interlego. See, for example, Justice Dorner's remarks in A CUM Ltd. v. Galey Zahal Radio Sta-
tion. PLA 6141/02 ACUM Ltd. v. Galey Zahal Radio Station 57(2) IsrSC 625 [2003] (Isr.).
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that limited monopolies and economic incentives in the guise of copy-
rights are necessary for authors and other creative minds to foster the
continuous enrichment of the public domain.82
The question remains, however, of whether the economic incentive-
based approach to copyright can cure the shortcoming of the doctrine.
I agree that, as Cass Sunstein writes, without economic incentives,
"many people will not produce desirable products, and society will be
much poorer and more ignorant as a result."83 But as much as the
utilitarian approach seems attractive, it has its flaws: too many incen-
tives have a chilling effect on the social and cultural development of
society. In order to arrive at a proper formula for ethical copyright,
recourse to other approaches is required. Madhavi Sunder recently
argued that "[d]espite . .. real world changes, intellectual property
scholars increasingly explain their field through the lens of econom-
ics." 8 4 And Rebecca Tushnet asserted that "[p]sychological and socio-
logical concepts can do more to explain creative impulses than
classical economics."85 Indeed, scholars, in their attempt to construct
their vision of copyright, have developed new approaches to copyright
outside the realm of economics and invited considerations from the
parlance familiar in other disciplines.
One of these approaches is social-institutional planning. This meth-
odology is based on William Fisher's social planning approach to cop-
82, Legislative instruments adopting a utilitarian vision can be traced back to the first modem
copyright law, the Statute of Anne, 1709, and its influences on the evolution of Anglo-American
copyright laws. The title of that legislation reads, "An Act for the Encouragement of Learning,
by vesting the Copies of printed Books in the Authors, or Purchasers, of such Copies, during the
Times therein mentioned," further holding the law to be "For the Encouragement of Learning
Men to Compose and Write Useful Books." Also, the utilitarian justification for the logic of
copyright and patent regimes is best captured by the wording of the U.S. Constitution: Congress
is empowered "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discover-
ies." U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
The proposal for the new Israeli Copyright Act of 2007 also provides, in its explanatory mem-
orandum, that the role and ideology of copyright is to balance between the different interests
within the copyright system: "between the need to provide adequate incentives to creative en-
deavours, in the guise of economic rights, and between the need to allow the public access and
use of copyrighted works in order to develop science and culture ..... 196 Official Journal 1161
(July 20, 2005).
83. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: How MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE 165 (2006).
84. Sunder, supra note 2, at 261. She continues and remarks that current social developments
make us aware of the fact "that traditional law and economics analysis fails to capture fully the
struggles at the heart of local and global intellectual property law conflicts." Id. at 263.
85. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 515; see also Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright
Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 1151 (2007) (arguing against the view of reducing creativity to
either economics-based or rights-based theories).
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yright8 6 and is similar to utilitarianism in its teleological orientation,
but dissimilar in its willingness to deploy visions of a desirable society
richer than the conceptions of "social welfare" deployed by utilitari-
ans.8 7 Fairness from socio-institutional planning advocates a less rigid
set of intellectual property laws and cultural hierarchy in order to fa-
cilitate a freer communicative sphere.88 Copyright, Netanel argues,
must leave ample space for expression "from a multiplicity of
sources." 89 This vision of copyright did not find support in the Geva
decision. In that case, the Israeli Supreme Court rejected an invita-
tion by the caricaturist Geva to treat Donald Duck's figure in the fol-
lowing way:
Donald Duck's figure has become a widely known cultural symbol
and part of the reality surrounding us. As such, it has become part
of the public domain . . . a sign that has acquired a precise meaning
in the collective cultural language of educated people, living in
Western cultures. It is therefore part of the cultural language that
people use in the course of communication . 90
An additional theory justifying copyright and the imposition of lim-
its on rightholders that attracted scholars' attention is the social con-
struction theory. According to this approach, which firmly rejects
notions of the romantic author, the creative process is a collective so-
cial process. Viewing copyright from the perspective of social con-
struction is premised on the general social construction theory that is
defined by Ian Hacking as "various sociological, historical, and philo-
sophical projects that aim at displaying or analyzing actual, historically
situated, social interactions or causal routes that led to, or were in-
volved in, the coming into being or establishing of some present entity
or fact." 91 It is not too remote to expect courts to be attentive to the
86. See William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
1203 (1998).
87. See id. at 1215.
88. See, e.g., ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES:
AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAw (1998); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierar-
chy and Copyright in Our System of Free Expression, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1879, 1926 (2000).
89. Netanel, supra note 88, at 1926; see generally NETANEL, supra note 6; Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996).
90. PLA 2687/92 Geva v. Walt Disney Co. 48(1) IsrSC 251, 260 [1993] (Isr.). Similarly, taking
the Mickey Mouse image as an example, Jeremy Waldron argues that once a cultural object is
"thrust out into the cultural world to impinge on the consciousness of all of us," we cannot
ignore it, "it has become ... part of our lives." Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers:
Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellectual Property, 68 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 841, 883
(1993). Hence, it should now be treated as part of the public domain.
91. IAN HACKING, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT? 48 (1999). On copyright and social
constructionism, see Peter Jaszi & Martha Woodmansee, Introduction, in THE CONSTRUCTION
OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE 1 (Martha Woodmansee
& Peter Jaszi eds., 1994) (positing the singular author within a social context and showing his
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rationale of this theory. The Israeli Supreme Court implicitly referred
to the social construction theory in Aloniel Ltd. v. Ariel McDonald, a
case dealing with an infringement of the McDonald's trademark. The
court remarked that
[t]he success of a work protected under copyright laws is a direct
result of social reality. . . . Despite the fundamental contribution of
the public to the value of a copyrighted commodity, the law pro-
vides a private property right in these commodities. At the same
time, it subjects the right to fair dealing exceptions and
limitations. . 92
And, in the recent Shoham v. Shmuel Harrar case, dealing with in-
fringement of a design right, the court went further and explicitly re-
ferred to the social construction theory reminding us that "property
rights are all fruits of social construction." 9 3
To sum up, Israeli copyright law considers Benthamite-style utilita-
rianism the best option for the system's ideological basis, having re-
jected the natural right approach. At the same time, it draws benefits
from other theoretical methodologies. Approaching copyright from a
multiplicity of ideologies should become the norm, not the exception.
It would enable courts to recognize that "the interrelationship be-
tween culture and economics goes well beyond incentives." 94 Only a
pluralistic ideological agenda will allow courts a wider interpretive soil
on which to develop norms of fairness within copyright law commen-
surate with the needs of both authors and the public.
IV. FAIRNESS AND FAIR USE
A. Fair Use Reform as a Defining Historical Moment
There are ample ways to approach comparative assessments of his-
torical change and legal reform. Finding a common ground between
the system under scrutiny and other systems is perhaps the best first
step. Western democracies ensure that their copyright laws ade-
quately balance between various competing interests via the recogni-
dependency on collaboration in the creative process). I further explore this argument in LIOR
ZEMER, THE IDEA OF AUTHORSHIP IN COPYRIGHT (2007) and in Lior Zemer, The Copyright
Moment, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 247 (2006).
92. PLA 8483/02 Aloniel Ltd. v. Ariel McDonald IsrSC 314, 353-54 [2004] (Isr.) (Heb.)
(translation by author).
93. PLA 2287/00 Shoham v. Shmuel Harrar 1 18 [2005] (Isr.) (unpublished) (Heb.) (transla-
tion by author).
94. Sunder, supra note 2, at 264. On the role of integrating various economic and social justi-
fications and values in property, see Amnon Lehavi, The Property Puzzle, 96 GEO. L.J. 1987,
1999 (2008) ("[P]roperty should reflect various goals and values, which at times cohabit comfort-
ably and in other instances make necessary a conscious compromise in the construction of spe-
cific property rules .... .").
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tion of certain standards. Together, these standards define the
ownership spectrum and the strength of trespassory rules that authors
and other creative beneficiaries enjoy.95 One of the defining methods
for these standards is found in the fair use doctrine. The 2007 Act
replaced the dogmatic British fair dealing doctrine with the U.S. fair
use model. This change is the most fundamental change in the 2007
Act. It does not merely indicate legal departure but instead marks a
substantive ideological change.
Fair use systems disclose how the given copyright system treats the
concept of fairness in the design of regulations and norms. Their sub-
stantive terms also tell us how any given system applies these norms to
a sensitive field of law that regulates the dissemination of knowledge
and the acquisition of property over cultural commodities and other
collective enterprises. The way by which the Israeli legislature
grounded fairness in the 2007 Act tells us three main things. First, it
informs us of the system's wider ethical vision of copyright in its deal-
ing with the "multitude of dangers" that intellectual property systems
create.96 Second, it explains the system's openness to rethink the enti-
tlement structure inherent in its copyright regime and its willingness
to accommodate unforeseen social needs and cultural changes. Third,
it reveals the system's commitment to ensuring that fair use and other
lists of exceptions and limitations to authorial and artistic rights are
not "incredibly shrinking. "*
B. Fairness and Copyright Stability
Fairness, in every legislative arrangement, is a core factor in the
law's ability to achieve and maintain social acceptance and practical
stability. Although fairness is a principle that does not explicitly di-
rect us to a particular meaning,98 it sits at the heart of what defines the
legitimate boundaries of every legal doctrine. 99 Courts find it difficult
95. As James Harris put it, "By instituting trespassory rules whose content restricts uses of the
ideational entity, intellectual property law preserves to an individual or group of individuals an
open-ended set of use-privileges and powers of control and transmission characteristic of owner-
ship interests over tangible items." J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 44 (1996).
96. JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 68 (2008).
97. See Symposium, Fair Use: Incredibly Shrinking or Extraordinarily Expanding, 31 COLUM.
J. L. & ARTS (2008).
98. As Easterbrook and Fischel once remarked, "Fairness is an invulnerable position; who is
for unfairness? But for lawyers fairness is 'a suitcase full of bottled ethics from which one freely
chooses to blend his own type of justice."' Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corpo-
rate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 703 n.17 (1982) (quoting George J. Stigler, The Law
and Economics of Public Policy: A Plea to the Scholars, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1972)).
99. See, e.g., KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS
& PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITES 161 (2006) ("IFlairness is a key factor in the long-term success of
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to define fairness. The U.S. Supreme Court once remarked that fun-
damental fairness is "a requirement whose meaning can be as opaque
as its importance is lofty." 00 Despite the difficulty to define its
proper scope and definitional boundaries, it is a fundamental principle
of every legal culture. It is a social concern, which means that errors
in the adequate elaborations on the applicability of the principle in-
volve social and other costs.101 "'Fairness' is a nebulous value suscep-
tible to many different interpretations and applicable across a wide
range of legislation."' 0 2 In other words, fairness is a concept that re-
fers to an arsenal of competing interpretations, conceptions, and per-
mutations, rendering its meaning "essentially contested." 03
Fairness in copyright has a special and important meaning to both
rightholders and the public. In the words of Wendy Gordon, fair use
"seeks to accommodate the author's need to remuneration and con-
trol while recognizing that in specific instances that author's rights
must give way before a social need for access and use."'0 As the law
that regulates the allocation of property rights in authorial and artistic
commodities, copyright is responsible for taking into account the in-
terests of two prominent and competing camps. Paul Goldstein calls
these two camps optimists and pessimists:
On one side are lawyers who assert that copyright is rooted in natu-
ral justice, entitling authors to every last penny that other people
will pay to obtain copies of their works. These are the copyright
optimists: they view copyright's cup of entitlement as always half
full, only waiting to be filled still further. On the other side of the
debate are copyright pessimists, who see copyright's cup as half
empty: they accept that copyright owners should get some measure
of control over copies as an incentive to produce creative works, but
they would like copyright to extend only so far as is necessary to
give this incentive, and treat anything more as an encroachment on
the general freedom of everyone to write and say what they
please.' 05
the firm."); HARISH C. JAIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT EQUITY AND AFFIRMATIVE AcrION: AN IN-
TERNATIONAL COMPARISON, at ix (2003) ("[Flairness is a crucial element in any social com-
pact."); Ian B. Lee, Fairness and Insider Trading, 1 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 119, 121 (2002)
(arguing that market fairness rationale "is devoid of principled content").
100. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981).
101. See, e.g., Sandra Rousseau, The Use of Warnings in the Presence of Errors, 29 INT'L REV.
L. & ECON. 191 (2009).
102. Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Cannons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 179
(2010).
103. I elaborate on this argument below. See infra Part IX.A.2.
104. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1602 (1982).
105. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 25, at 10-11.
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Striking this balance between the camps is not an easy task. Copy-
right laws make available a bundle of exclusive rights to creators and
owners of copyrighted works,106 but declare that this bundle is not
unlimited. Copyright laws design a set of principles and norms in or-
der to accommodate the consequences of the monopolization of au-
thorial endeavors. 107 This set attests to the law's commitment to
maintaining fairness. It is "neither unfair nor unfortunate." 0 8 It is
the means by which copyright promotes the "Progress of Science and
... Arts."109 For example, copyright laws limit the length of the right
and its scope. The former refers to the acceptable standards of the
limited duration of the right, 10 and the latter to the idea/expression
dichotomy, which ensures that ideas remain free and reside within the
public domain."'
Fair use, a copyright doctrine that "endlessly fascinates us,"1 1 2 is
perhaps the most important one in this set of principles. Ideologically
speaking, the doctrine serves to rectify two different inherent
problems within copyright. The first, as the Gowers Review of Intel-
lectual Property provides, is transaction costs: "There are uses of copy-
right protected material for which it would be too costly and too time
consuming to clear the rights .... "113 The second concerns issues of
equity. Whereas the former refers to the economics of allocating
rights in the marketplace of ideas, the latter refers to the general pub-
lic interest. The economic argument is a response to market condi-
tions that bar users from access to copyrighted materials.114 The
106. Similar to tangible property, copyright confers an exclusive title, which gives its owner
the right to use, the right to exclude all others both from use and possession, and the right to
transmit use and possession to others. See, e.g., Tony Honor6, Ownership, in MAKING LAW
BIND: ESSAYS LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 161, 166-79 (1987).
107. On the evils of intellectual monopolies, see MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE,
AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 68-96 (2008).
108. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991).
109. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
110. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(1998).
111. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). If copyright is to achieve its goals,
every idea must remain "in the air." As Justice Frankfurter remarked in Marconi Wireless v.
United States, great inventions and copyrighted works "have always been parts of an evolution,
the culmination at a particular moment of an antecedent process . . . the history of thought
records striking coincidental discoveries-showing that the new insight first declared to the
world by a particular individual was 'in the air."' 320 U.S. 1, 62 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
112. Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 433, 433 (2008).
113. HM TREASURY, GOWERs REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 14 (2006).
114. The economic approach to fair use is associated with Wendy Gordon's article on "Fair
Use as Market Failure." Gordon, supra note 104, at 1600. Reacting to the Sony saga, she claims
that fair use is a legitimate user's departure from the market. Id.; see also Sony Corp. v. Univer-
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argument from equity is aimed at curing specific situations where the
public's access would be prohibited despite the presence of an ethical
or social reason that supports their claim. Immediate examples in-
clude the enabling of use licenses for educational purposes, by news
reporters, by disabled people, or in cases of incidental inclusions. In
other words, the fair use doctrine is a zero-price compulsory license
on copyrighted works for particular uses identified by the law, ensur-
ing that certain acts do not infringe copyright even in the absence of
an author's permission. Given the doctrine's commitment to simulta-
neously respond to market conditions and social needs, it sits at the
heart of contemporary copyright debates discussing the dangers inher-
ent in treating copyright as a "Caesar right."115
Fair use is a contestable concept. This is evident in the ways juris-
dictions design their versions of fair use. The U.S. model is claimed to
be "broader and less well defined than even facially comparable doc-
trines in other countries." 116 The Philippines,'17 Singapore," 8 and
now Israel have legislated a U.S.-like fair use doctrine composed of an
open-ended list of exceptions and limitations to authors' exclusive
rights, where these enumerated exceptions are merely illustrative ex-
amples of allowable exceptions.119 Other common law jurisdictions,
sal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Market conditions that merit such departure include,
for example, excessive transaction costs. Once a court has concluded that market conditions
allow the imposition of a limitation to the right of an author or artist, a fair use argument can be
raised. In the words of Gordon,
Fair use is one label courts use when they approve a user's departure from the market.
A useful starting place for analysis of when fair use is appropriate is therefore an identi-
fication of when flaws in the market might make reliance on the judiciary's own analy-
sis of social benefit appropriate.
Gordon, supra note 104, at 1614. Gordon designs a three-stage test to determine fair use: "(1)
market failure is present; (2) transfer of the use to defendant is socially desirable; and (3) an
award of fair use would not cause substantial injury to the incentives of the plaintiff copyright
owner." Id. On the economic approach to copyright, see William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989).
115. Wendy J. Gordon, Render Copyright unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives Seriously, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 75, 77 (2004).
116. JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION EcONoMY 528 (2006).
117. See An Act Prescribing the Intellectual Property Code and Establishing the Intellectual
Property Office, Providing for Its Powers and Functions, and for Other Purposes, Rep. Act No.
8293, § 185 (Phil.).
118. See Singapore Copyright Act 1987, S 107/87 ch. 63, § 35(2) [1988] (Sing.). Although the
Act refers to fair dealing, the provision is in fact an adoption of the fair use model. See NG-Loy
WEE LOON, LAW OF INTELLEC-UAL PROPERTY IN SINGAPORE 11.3.16 (2008).
119. On the difference between exceptions and limitations and the different fair use doctrines,
see SAM RICKETSON, WIPO STUDY ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS OF COPYRIGHT AND RE-
LATED RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT (Standing Committee on Copyright & Related
Rights, June 23-27, 2003). See also MARTIN SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND THE
THREE-STEP-TEST (2004).
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such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and
India, as well as European Union member states, subscribe to a closed
list of exceptions and limitations-thereby severely limiting the inter-
pretive spectrum of the doctrine. 120 As Bently and Sherman put it,
under United Kingdom fair dealing doctrine, the dealing must be fair
for the purposes enumerated in the closed list, and "it is irrelevant
that the use might be fair for a purpose not specified in the Act, or
that it is fair in general."121 An immediate result of these jurisdic-
tional differences is the difficulty with international harmonization of
a workable toolkit for fair use incidents.122
Calls to redesign fair use doctrines are abundant.123 One of the rea-
sons for these calls is the fact that courts tend to embrace classical
notions of property when dealing with cultural appropriation. Al-
though "the traditional forms of tangible property can be carried over
to intangible property even after the rise of modern technologies,"'124
this does not necessitate the perpetuation of the perception that
"[a]uthors tend to win."125 Certainly, a property right is a legitimate
Blackstonian wish of every individual or group of individuals,126 which
remains relevant in the digital era.127 However, given the impact of
copyrighted materials on the cultural development and stability of so-
ciety and its members, systems allocating exclusive rights of use and
exploitation in cultural properties must remain attentive to the social
consequences of this preference. Treating cultural properties as assets
that can be subjected to exclusive ownership essentially means that
our culture and social reality can be owned, with the prerequisites of
buying, selling, destroying, abandoning, transferring, and excluding.
The fair use doctrine is an exemplar of a legal mechanism designed to
overcome such consequences.
Fair use in Israel, as modified by the legislature and interpreted and
shaped by courts, is still in the process of being realized and rational-
ized. The success of this rationalization process is dependent on the
availability of a multiplicity of ideological approaches to copyright to
120. See infra notes 252-69 and accompanying text.
121. L. BENTLY & B. SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 193 (2d ed. 2004).
122. International conflicts concerning the interpretation of fairness in copyright prove that
harmonization is a muddy task. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, REPORT OF THE PANEL ON
UNITED STATES-SECTION 110(5) OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT Acr (June 15, 2000).
123. See generally Symposium, supra note 97.
124. Epstein, supra note 1, at 456.
125. BOYLE, supra note 96, at 116.
126. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, bk. 2, 1 (But-
terworth & Son, 16th ed. 1825).
127. See Robert P. Merges, The Concept of Property in the Digital Era, 45 Hous. L. REV.
1239, 1240-41 (2008).
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overcome its inherent conflicts. Recourse to these approaches,
whether by the courts or in the course of legislative processes, can
help to disclose the bare anatomy of copyright and the flawed legal
intersections that made fair use "'the most troublesome [doctrine] in
the whole law of copyright."' 1 28
V. THE OLD FAIR DEALING DOCTRINE
A. Fair Dealing Under the Imperial Model Act
The British 1911 Copyright Act (the 1911 Act) defined fair dealing
by prescribing a closed and exhaustive list of fair dealing incidents,
such as making a photograph of a work that is permanently in a public
place or publication in a newspaper of a report of a lecture delivered
in public. 129 In these incidents a user would not be liable for infringe-
ment or requested to pay any royalties in cases of use of the
128. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963, 969 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting
Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1939)).
129. 1911 Act, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46 (Eng.). Section 2(1) relating to the "Infringment of Copy-
right" read as follows:
2. - (1) Copyright in a work shall be deemed to be infringed by any person who,
without the consent of the owner of the copyright, does anything the sole right to do
which is by this Act conferred on the owner of the copyright: Provided that the follow-
ing acts shall not constitute an infringement of copyright: -
(i) Any fair dealing with any work for the purposes of private study, research, criticism,
review, or newspaper summary:
(ii) Where the author of an artistic work is not the owner of the copyright therein, the
use by the author of any mould, cast, sketch, plan, model, or study made by him for the
purpose of the work, provided that he does not thereby repeat or imitate the main
design of the work:
(iii) The making or publishing of paintings, drawings, engravings, or photographs of a
work of sculpture or artistic craftsmanship, if permanently situate[d] in a public place
or building, or the making or publishing of paintings, drawings, engravings, or photo-
graphs (which are not in the nature of architectural drawings or plans) of any architec-
tural work of art:
(iv) The publication in a collection, mainly composed of non-copyright matter, bond
fide intended for the use of schools, and so described in the title and in any advertise-
ments issued by the publisher, of short passages from published literary works not
themselves published for the use of schools in which copyright subsists: Provided that
not more than two of such passages from works by the same author are published by
the same publisher within five years, and that the source from which such passages are
taken is acknowledged:
(v) The publication in a newspaper of a report of a lecture delivered in public, unless
the report is prohibited by conspicuous written or printed notice affixed before and
maintained during the lecture at or about the main entrance of the building in which
the lecture is given, and, except whilst the building is being used for public worship, in a
position near the lecturer; but nothing in this paragraph shall affect the provisions in
paragraph (i) as to newspaper summaries:




rightholder's work without consent. In addition to these exceptions,
the legislature enacted a specific provision in 1996 to regulate private
and domestic use.130 Apart from the prescribed fair dealings, § 2(1)(i)
did contain a more general norm: "any fair dealing with any work for
the purpose of private study, research, criticism, review or newspaper
summary." This provision was an earlier version of the classic fair
dealing doctrine found in other common law countries, such as the
United Kingdom, 31 Australia,132 Canada,' 33 India,134 New Zealand,135
and South Africa. 136 However, the narrow nature of this provision
made it impossible for courts to adequately respond to contemporary
copyright challenges.
B. Fair Use as a Judicial Legal Transplant
Fair use doctrines have been judicially created and shaped. 37 The
first legislative appearance of any such doctrine in a common law ju-
risdiction was in the 1911 Copyright Act. Until 1911, the United
Kingdom fair dealing standard was closer to a quasi-American fair use
one. Courts were expected to determine fairness on grounds not spec-
ified in legislation 38 and permit, for example, fair abridgement in or-
der to not "put manacles upon science."1 39 Just as the 1911 Act
codified the British judges' prescriptions for fair dealings, the U.S.
Copyright Act of 1976140 is based on and follows Justice Joseph
Story's description in Folsom v. Marsh'41 of how a court should ex-
130. See 1924 Ordinance, 114 Official Gazette 623, § 3C [1924] (Eng.) ("Recording or copying
a work on recordable media for private and domestic, but not commercial, uses shall not be a
violation of copyright and performers' rights.").
131. See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (CDPA), 1988, c. 48, § 29 (Eng.). Section 29
complies with the closed list of exceptions and limitations provided under Article 5 of the Direc-
tive of the European Parliament and the Council "on the harmonisation of certain aspects of
copyright and related rights in the information society." Directive 2001/29/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 167
10, art. 5) [hereinafter InfoSoc Directive].
132. See Copyright Act 1968, pt. III, div. 3 (cth) (Austl.).
133. See Copyright Act R.S. 1921, § 29 (Can.).
134. See The Copyright Act, No. 49 of 1999, [INDIA CODE] ch. XI (1957), Vol. 14 (Ind.).
135. See Copyright Act 1994, §§ 42-43 (N.Z.).
136. See Copyright Act 98 of 1978, § 12 (S. Afr.).
137. See generally WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW (2d ed.
1995).
138. See, e.g., Wilkins v. Aikin, (1810) 17 Vesey 422 (Eng.); Smith v. Chato, (1874) 31 L.T. 77
(Eng.).
139. Cary v. Kearsley, (1803) 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 680 (K.B.) (Eng.).
140. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
141. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
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amine a claim for fair abridgement.142 These jurisdictions' statutes no-
tably vary in how they approach fair use today,143 but both find their
roots in judicial opinions.
To this day, courts continue to play a crucial role in the develop-
ment of fair use doctrines. Recently, for example, the Canadian Su-
preme Court had redefined the scope of fair dealing in that country.
In CCH v. Law Society of Upper Canada, the court unanimously held
that the Law Society did not infringe on copyright because its great
library reproduction services were permitted under the fair dealing list
of exceptions.'" The court endorsed the following six factors to de-
termine the fairness of the dealing: the purpose (and the commercial
nature) of the dealing; the character of the dealing; the amount taken;
alternatives to the dealing; the nature of the work; and the effect of
the dealing on the work.145
Similarly, the reality of an outdated copyright law required the
courts' guidance. The Israeli Supreme Court responded to this need
in Geva.146 This case concerned a dispute between Walt Disney, the
owner of the Donald Duck character, and one of the most famous
cartoonists in Israel, the late Dudu Geva. The latter used Donald
Duck's image in his story "Mobi Duck" published in his book entitled
The Duck's Book. The court examined whether Geva's use of the
character constituted a fair dealing and, for the first time, imported
the four-factor fair use test from § 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act of
1976.147
The Geva decision was a signal from the court to the legislature and
to the copyright community that it will aggressively react when the
legislature is late in its response to market conditions and other social
142. Justice Story never used the words "fair use" in that case. It took twenty-eight years until
the first appearance of the term in the case of Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (C.C.D. Mass.
1869).
The following explanation of Justice Story has become the most cited passage in the history of
fair use: "In short, we must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the nature and
objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in
which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the
original work." Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348. For an overview of the case, see R. Anthony Reese,
The Story of Folsom v. Marsh.- Distinguishing Between Infringing and Legitimate Uses (Copy-
right), in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIEs 259 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss
eds., 2006).
143. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
144. See CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc'y of Upper Can. [2004] S.C.R. 339, 379 (Can.).
145. Id. For a comparative analysis of these six factors, see generally Giuseppina D'Agostino,
Healing Fair Dealing? A Comparative Copyright Analysis of Canada's Fair Dealing to U.K. Fair
Dealing and U.S. Fair Use, 53 McGILL L.J. 309 (2008).
146. PLA 2687/92 Geva v. Walt Disney Co. 48(1) IsrSC 251 [1993] (Isr.).
147. See id.
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values that represent the spirit of a democratic copyright agenda. In
this case the court applied the method of judicial legal transplantation
by inviting a foreign standard into local law. As Assaf Likhovski
writes, "Legal norms are sometimes imported and exported not only
because of their intrinsic worthiness, but also because the process of
transplantation is conducive to sending various types of signals to vari-
ous types of audiences."148 The court did not do what American com-
mon law courts routinely do-using the parlance of Melvin Eisenberg,
the court did not enrich an existing model,149 or as William Eskridge
remarked, it did not engage in the process of "dynamic statutory inter-
pretation."150 Rather, the court actively imported into the local law a
new standard of fairness that had no independent basis in the text of
its existing copyright statutes.
The immediate consequence of this court-made rule was the crea-
tion of a two-prong cumulative test for fair use in Israel that was based
on both the British 1911 Act's fair dealing test and the U.S. fair use
test. Indeed, as Justice Maltz remarked in Geva, in every case of fair
dealing, the court would have to separately examine the purpose of
the use and its fairness. This created a more difficult situation for de-
fendants, who now had to show that the use was included in the list of
fair dealings and that it was fair on the basis of the four factors. The
new test for fairness suffered from two major problems: "the lack of
flexibility resulting from the nature of the closed list of exceptions in
the fair dealing doctrine and the lack of legal certainly associated with
the four conditions."1 5 '
Subsequent decisions delivered by the Israeli Supreme Court ap-
plied and refined the two-prong test. In Mifal Hapais v. The Roy Ex-
port Establishment Co., a case concerning the use of Charlie Chaplin's
character in a commercial for the Israeli lottery, the Court rejected
the argument that the use was fair because a fictional character does
not deserve copyright protection and that the use was for nonprofit
purposes and for matters of criticism. Justice Tirkel found that the
148. Assaf Likhovski, Argonauts of the Eastern Mediterranean: Legal Transplants and Signal-
ing, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 619, 621 (2009). On legal transplants, see generally ALAN
WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAw (2d ed. 1993); Michele
Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and Receptions, in THE OXFORD HAND-
BOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAw 441 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006); Ugo
Mattei, Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative Law and Economics, 14 INT'L
REV. L. & EcoN. 3 (1994).
149. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAw 6-7 (1988).
150. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1481
(1987).
151. Niva Elkin-Koren, Users' Rights Under Copyright, in AUTHORING RIGHTS: READINGS IN
COPYRIGHT LAw, supra note 66, at 327, 353 (Heb.) (translation by author).
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first part of Geva's test, the purpose of the use, is less important, while
the second part, the fairness of the use, is crucial. Justice Tirkel held
that the use of Sir Charles Spencer's character was for commercial
purposes and was therefore not fair dealing. 152
In the later case of Eisenman v. Qimron (the Dead Sea Scrolls
Case),53 the court reapplied Geva's test and held that the reconstruc-
tion and decipherment of the Dead Sea Scrolls entitled its author to
copyright. The Scrolls, claimed to be the single most important
archaeological find of the twentieth century,154 provide fresh evidence
from the period in which Judaism was consolidated and Christianity
was born. Scholars reconstructed the text of the ancient Scrolls and,
although they were not the authors of the Scrolls, argued for copyright
in their version because of the many educated guesses that the fallible
process of reconstruction necessitated. The court supported the schol-
ars' claim for copyright with the following argument:
Deciphering the text dictates, to some extent, the arrangement of
the "islands" of fragments; the arrangement influences the possible
meaning of the text, its construction and content, and the way of
filling the gaps in it. The different phases of the work should not be
separated from each other, and should be considered as one work.
Examining the work, with its various phases, as one whole work,
reveals undoubted originality and creativity.' 55
Here again, Justice Tirkel emphasized the role of the two-prong test
and, in just couple of paragraphs, dismissed the fair dealing defense
because the appellants used the deciphered text in its entirety and
without any attribution to Qimron.156
VI. THE NEw FAIR USE FORMULA
A. Definition
The fair use formula developed in Geva is grounded in Chapter D
of the 2007 Israeli Copyright Act, under the title of "Permitted
152. CA 8393/96 Mifal Hapais v. The Roy Export Est. Co. 54(1) IsrSC 577, 587 [2000] (Isr.)
[hereinafter Charlie Chaplin Case].
153. See generally CA 2790, 2811/93 Eisenman v. Qimron (Dead Sea Scrolls Case) 54(3) IsrSC
817 [2000] (Isr.).
154. See generally Hector L. MacQueen, Copyright Law and the Dead Sea Scrolls: A British
Perspective, in ON SCROLLS, ARTEFACTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 99 (Timothy H. Lim,
Hector L. MacQueen & Calum M. Carmichael eds., 2001); see also David Nimmer, Copyright in
the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and Originality, 38 Hous. L. REV. 1 (2001).
155. Dead Sea Scrolls Case 54(3) IsrSC at 14. This is quoted from an unofficial translation
available at http://www.tau.ac.il/law/members/birnhack/DSStransaltion.pdf (last visited Apr. 8,
2011).
156. See Dead Sea Scrolls Case 54(3) IsrSC at 1$ 19-20.
DEPA UL LAW REVIEW
Acts."15 7 Chapter D prescribes twelve permitted uses and an open-
textured norm directing courts to review fair use according to four
factors of fairness. Apart from the U.S. influence, this formula relied
on the internationationi standard harmonizing exceptions and limita-
tions,158 fair dealing systems from other jurisdictions,15 9 including the
1968 Australian Copyright Act, the 1988 British CDPA, and European
Union legislation.160
Six core changes were introduced in Chapter D: replacing "fair
dealing" with "fair use"; opening the closed list of exceptions and limi-
tations; replacing "newspaper summary" with "journalistic reporting";
adding new uses such as "quotations" and "instruction and examina-
tion by an educational institution"; legislating Geva's cumulative test;
and providing the Israeli Minister of Justice a role in determining fur-
ther conditions for fair uses.
B. Open-Textured Norm
A fair use doctrine is expected to create "a checklist of things to be
considered rather than a formula for decision."'61 This rationale de-
fines the U.S.-style fair use policy, which was adopted almost verbatim
157. Amira Dotan et al., Fair Use Best Practices for Higher Education Instructions: The Israeli
Experience, J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 447, 511-15 (2010).
158. This standard is know as the "Three Step Test" legitimizing exceptions and limitations in
copyright. Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention provides that
(1) Authors of literary and artistic works protected by this Convention shall have the
exclusive right of authorizing the reproduction of these works, in any manner or form.
(2) It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the repro-
duction of such works in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does not
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice
the legitimate interests of the author.
(3) Any sound or visual recording shall be considered as a reproduction for the pur-
poses of this Convention.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886) (Paris Act, July 24,
1971). See also Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)
art. 13.
159. For a general comparative reading of the new Act, see Weisman, supra note 66, at 69. On
comparative aspects of fair use, see generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT.
PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.5 (2001). See also 1 SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG,
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BE-
YOND 755-878 (2d ed. 2005).
160. For example, the main items in § 24, dealing with exceptions in the field of computer
programs, were borrowed from the EC Directive 91/250/EEC, Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, 1991 O.J. (L122/42); § 24(c)(2) is based on § 47F of the Australian Copyright Act,
1968.
161. Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 522 (7th Cir. 2002).
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by the Israeli legislature. 162 Section 19 of the 2007 Act provides the
following:
(a) Fair use of a work is permitted for purposes such as: private
study, research, criticism, review, journalistic reporting, quota-
tion, or instruction and examination by an educational
institution.
(b) In determining whether a use made of a work is fair within the
meaning of this section the factors to be considered shall in-
clude, inter alia, all of the following:
(1) The purpose and character of the use;
(2) The character of the work used;
(3) The scope of the use, quantitatively and qualitatively, in re-
lation to the work as a whole;
(4) The impact of the use on the value of the work and its po-
tential market.
(c) The Minister may make regulations prescribing conditions
under which a use shall be deemed a fair use.163
162. For matters of comparison it is worth quoting § 107 of the U.S. 1976 Copyright Act in
full:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copy-
righted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any
other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or re-
search, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a
work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commer-
cial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
163. Copyright Act 2007, 5768-2007, 2007 LSI 34 (Isr.). Despite the similarities between the
U.S. fair use doctrine found in § 107 and chapter D of the new Israeli Act, the doctrines are not
fully identical. For example, (1) U.S. courts do not pay much attention to the purpose of the use
and emphasize the four factors of fairness, whereas in Israel courts are expected to apply both
parts of Geva's test; (2) the first factor in § 19(b) refers to "the purpose and character of the
use," whereas § 107 of the U.S. Act mentions "the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes"; (3) under
§ 19(c), "[t]he Minister may make regulations prescribing conditions under which a use shall be
deemed a fair use." This ministerial prerogative does not exist in the U.S. doctrine. I further
explore these differences in the analysis below. See also Neil W. Netanel, Israeli Fair Use from
an American Perspective, in AUTHORING RIGIrrs: READINGS IN COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 66,
at 377, 377 (Heb.). This Part of the present Article expands issues I examined in Lior Zemer,
The Emancipation of Fair Use, in THE COMMON LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF PROFESSOR DAVID VAVER 281 (Catherine W. Ng et al. eds., 2010). For a brief
account on § 19, see Orit Fischman Afori, An Open Standard "Fair Use" Doctrine: A Welcome
Israeli Initiative, 2008 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 85.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Chapter D cured many of the deficiencies in the old law by ex-
panding the scope of fair use, adding new uses, and opening the inter-
pretive boundaries of the doctrine. The addition of the term "such as"
in § 19(a) has opened up the list of exceptions, which would allow
courts a flexible interpretation of fair use.164 Before the enactment of
Chapter D, courts found it difficult to use previous texts to solve cer-
tain problems. In some instances they reached absurd decisions in
clear cases of fair dealing. For example, § 2(1) of the 1911 Act does
not refer to educational purposes or to instruction and examination.
In Ronen Bergman v. State of Israel, the court refused to grant the fair
dealing defense in a case brought against the Israeli Ministry of Edu-
cation by an author-journalist. The former used one of the latter's
essays published in a local magazine in a matriculation exam. Al-
though the court found that the use was a legitimate use for an educa-
tional cause, and that it did not inflict any harm on the author, it ruled
that the conditions for fair dealing were not satisfied because an exam
is not covered by § 2(1).165
Furthermore, the old law did not include criticism, review, and quo-
tation as fair dealings. Courts developed this exception and inter-
preted "criticism" generously. In the Geva saga, parody was
recognized as a form of legitimate criticism.166 In the later Charlie
Chaplin Case, the court broadened the scope of "criticism" and in-
cluded satire, contrary to the U.S. approach.167 This generous inter-
pretation, however, was mainly theoretical since in both cases the
court rejected the fair use claim. An Israeli court allowed a fair use
claim for parody in only one case. In Mosinzon v. Haephrati, Judge
Zaft of the Tel Aviv-Yaffo District Court held that a "modern sequel"
parodying a famous children's series of stories fit under the fair deal-
ing exception. 168 Here, the author of the sequel imagined the heroes
of the children's stories at their maturity and ridiculed them as adults.
Although criticism and review are now part of § 19(a), the open char-
acter of the section will allow courts to further widen the boundaries
of the doctrine and invite new uses into its scope.
164. Copyright Act 2007, 2007 LSI 34. The original version of § 19(a) referred to "inter alia"
instead of "such as." The legislature adopted the latter since it considered the former too wide
in scope. It is questionable whether "such as" and "inter alia" are distinct to the degree that
courts will apply them differently.
165. CC 12595/98 Ronen Bergman v. State of Israel Mag. Haifa (unpublished) (Jan. 2, 2001).
166. See PLA 2687/92 Geva v. Walt Disney Co. 48(1) IsrSC 251 [19931 (Isr.).
167. See generally Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir.
1997).
168. CC (TA) 1437/02 Mosinzon v. Haephrati 03(2) Tak-Dist. 30775 [20031 (Isr.).
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C. Individual Exceptions and Limitations
Together, the two parts of the Geva formula have widened the nor-
mative boundaries of what amounts to a "use" and whether the use is
"fair." Codifying the first part of the Geva test, the 2007 Act's Chap-
ter D provides a list of twelve incidents where users can access copy-
righted materials without obtaining the consent of the copyright
owner and without paying any royalties for the use.169 These incidents
include the following: the use of works in judicial or administrative
procedures; 170 reproduction of a work deposited for public inspec-
tions;171 incidental use;172 broadcasting or copying of a work in a pub-
lic place;173 reproduction or making of a derivative work of a
computer program by a possessor of an authorized copy of the pro-
gram (for instance, backup copies, maintenance and service, and error
corrections);174 ephemeral recordings; 75 temporary copies when the
copy "is an integral part of a technological process";' 76 additional ar-
tistic works made by an artist;'77 copying for preservation, renovation,
169. Copyright Act 2007, § 18 provides,
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 11 [copyright subject matter and what copy-
right means], the doing of the actions specified in sections 19 to 30 is permitted subject
to the conditions specified respectively in the aforesaid sections and for the purpose of
carrying out the objectives specified therein, without the consent of the right holder or
payment, however with respect to the activities specified in section 32-upon payment
and in accordance with the provisions of that section.
Copyright Act 2007, 5768-2007, 2007 LSI 34, § 18 (Isr.).
Section 32 creates a compulsory license to reproduce musical works in sound recordings
against payment of royalties. Copyright Act 2007, 2007 LSI 34, § 32. Cf. Copyright, Designs and
Patents Act (CDPA), 1988, c. 48, § 303(2) (Eng.); 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006).
170. Copyright Act 2007, 2007 LSI 34, § 20. Cf CDPA 1988, c. 48, § 45; InfoSoc Directive,
supra note 131, art. 5.3(e).
171. Copyright Act 2007, 2007 LSI 34, § 21. Cf CDPA 1988, c. 48, §§ 47, 49.
172. Section 22 allows incidental use of a work "by way of including it in a photographic work,
in a cinematographic work or in a sound recording, as well as the use of a such work in which the
work was thus incidentally contained, is permitted . . . ." Copyright Act 2007, 2007 LSI 34, § 22.
Cf CDPA 1988, c. 48, § 31. Section 22 limits the exception for musical works: "[Tihe deliberate
inclusion of a musical work, including its accompanying lyrics, or of a sound recording embody-
ing such musical work, in another work, shall not be deemed to be an incidental use." Copyright
Act 2007, 2007 LSI 34, § 22; see also CDPA 1988, c. 48, § 31(3).
173. Copyright Act 2007, 2007 LSI 34, § 23 ("Broadcasting, or copying by way of photogra-
phy, drawing, sketch or similar visual description, of an architectural work, a work of sculpture
or work of applied art, are permitted where the aforesaid work is permanently situated in a
public place."). Cf Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2000).
174. Copyright Act 2007, 2007 LSI 34, § 24.
175. Id. § 25. See also InfoSoc Directive, supra note 131, art. 5(2)(d); 17 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
176. This exception is mainly related to use of works in a computer program and in a commu-
nication network. Following Article 5(1) of the InfoSoc Directive, § 26 permits "transient copy-
ing, including incidental copying, of a work . . . if such is an integral part of a technological
process." Copyright Act 2007, 2007 LSI 34, § 26; cf InfoSoc Directive, supra note 131, art. 5(1).
177. Copyright Act 2007, 2007 LSI 34, § 27.
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and reconstruction of buildings; 78 public performance in educational
institutions;179 and uses by libraries and archives. 80 Chapter D also
provides that the minister may designate, by way of regulations con-
firmed by the Knesset's economic committee, other types of educa-
tional institutions, libraries, or archives' 8' that may preserve copies.
In doing so, the minister must take into consideration "the character
of their respective activities."182
Two additional comments should be made in order to provide a
more complete picture of fair use in the 2007 Act. First, private copy-
ing is still governed by the 1924 Copyright Ordinance, which provides
that the recording and reproduction of a recording of a copyrighted
work for noncommercial, private, and domestic use is allowed. 83
These exceptions refer to recording on a device, such as a tape re-
corder, on which a visual or audio recording can be made. However,
the 1924 provisions do not apply to devices "intended for use in a
computer." 84
Second, although the new version of fair use in the 2007 Act seems
more receptive to societal needs, it is unfortunate that uses by the
disabled were not explicitly included in the Act. Interestingly, in their
attempt to design copyright Eurotopia,185 the framers of the proposal
178. Id. § 28. See also InfoSoc Directive, supra note 131, art. 5(3)(e).
179. Copyright Act 2007, 2007 LSI 34, § 29. See also Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act
(CDPA), 1988, c. 48, § 34 (Eng.). See also Copyright Regulations (Public Performance in Educa-
tional Institutions), 6867 Official Journal 758 (Feb. 9, 2011).
180. Copyright Act 2007, 2007 LSI 34, § 30. For similar arrangements, see 17 U.S.C. § 108;
CDPA 1988, c. 48, §§ 37-42; InfoSoc Directive, supra note 131, art. 5(2)(c). See also CA 326/00
City of Holon v. NMC Music 57(3) IsrSC 658 [2003] (Isr.).
181. See Copyright Regulations (Libraries and Archives), 6732 Official Journal 229 (Dec. 23,
2008).
182. Copyright Act 2007, 2007 LSI 34, § 31. Other laws complement the exceptions in the
2007 Act. For example, § 6 of the Communications (Telecommunications and Broadcasts) Act
of 1982 requires that licensed cable and satellite operators in Israel carry broadcasts confirmed
under the Second Television and Radio Authority Act and by the Israel Broadcasting Authority
(IBA). Licensees are exempted from paying royalties to the owners of copyright or performers'
rights in these broadcasts. The pending Electronic Commerce Bill provides exemption for ISPs
from liability for copyright infringement in certain situations. The Tel Aviv-Yafo Magistrate
Court has already exempted an ISP from liability for hosting infringing copies of works applying
the fair dealing doctrine. See CC (Mag TA) 64045/04 Al-Hashulchan Gastronomic Centre Ltd.
v. Ort Israel 07(14) IsrSC 486 12007) (Isr.). And most recently, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled
that, due to the lack of legislative regulation, it will not be possible to oblige an Internet service
provider to unmask the identity of an anonymous commenter. RCA 4447/07 Rami Mor v. Barak
[2010] (Isr.).
183. Copyright Ordinance 1924, 114 Official Gazette 623, § 3C [1924] (Eng.).
184. Id. § 3B. Also, the Israeli Supreme Court has held that these provisions apply to devices
such as CD-R, DVD-R, or other similar devices. See City of Holon 57(3) IsrSC at 658.
185. David Vaver, Copyright in Europe: The Good, the Bad, and the Harmonized, 10 AusT.
INTELL. PROP. J. 186 (1999).
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for the European Union InfoSoc Directive included a special excep-
tion for people with disabilities. Although the original exception was
limited to only visually-impaired or hearing-impaired persons and ex-
cluded all other disabled people, such as those with learning difficul-
ties or mental and physical disabilities, the final version of the
Directive's Article 5(3)(b) now covers all persons "with a disability."
Still, the updated version contains restrictive language that the excep-
tion only applies "directly" to the disability and that the use should be
of a "non-commercial nature," raising similar concerns as the original
version. It is hoped that application by Israeli courts of fair use excep-
tions for the disabled will attract the optimal interpretive flexibility.
VII. THE FOUR FACrORS
The second part of the Geva two-prong test codified by the 2007
Act consists of the four factors specified in § 19(b). 186 The transform-
ative nature of the use is the most crucial consideration in applying
the first factor, as held in a landmark U.S. case Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc.187 Transformative use recasts the original work and
creates a new work by virtue of the added value created, altering the
original source with new expression, meaning, or message. That is,
"the more transformative the new work, the less will be the signifi-
cance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a
finding of fair use."' 88 Judge Leval viewed the extent of transforma-
tive nature as critical to whether a use "fulfill[ed] the objective of cop-
186. See PLA 2687/92 Geva v. Walt Disney Co. 48(1) IsrSC 251 [1993) (Isr.). For a hierarchi-
cal organization of the factors, see D'Agostino, supra note 145, at 356-58. For a comprehensive
analysis of how U.S. judges use the four-factor test to adjudicate the fair use defense, see Barton
Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
549, 554 (2008) ("[M]uch of our conventional wisdom about our fair use case law, deducted as it
has been from the leading cases, is wrong.").
187. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). In considering whether 2 Live
Crew's rap song Oh Pretty Woman might qualify as a fair use of Roy Orbison's song Pretty
Woman, the Court elaborated on the first fair use factor and held,
The central purpose of the investigation is to see . . . whether the new work merely
supersedefs] the objects of the original creation . . . or instead adds something new, with
a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, mean-
ing, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is
"transformative." Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a
finding of fair use . . . the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally
furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such works thus lie at the heart of
the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright
Id. at 579 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
188. Id.
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yright law to stimulate creativity."1 89 Proponents of this argument
hold that the transformative nature of use supports fair uses without
the consent of the rightholder in exchange for introducing some social
value.190
There is a fundamental difference between the stipulation of the
first factor in § 107(1) of the U.S. Copyright Act and § 19(b) in
Israel's 2007 Act. While the former follows the rationale that "fair use
doctrine is not a license for corporate theft, empowering a court to
ignore a copyright"191 and provides that the examination of the pur-
pose and character of the use should include "whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes," the lat-
ter does not refer to the commercial nature of the use and does not
make an explicit distinction between commercial uses and nonprofit
uses. This omission is a signal from the Israeli legislature to the courts
to put less emphasis on the commercial nature of the use.192 This mes-
sage to the courts is similar to the interpretation of the first factor in
the Canadian CCH case, holding that this factor "should not be given
a restrictive interpretation or this could result in the undue restriction
of users' rights." 193
Commercially oriented uses should be expected to display other
qualities that will justify the use.194 Courts have already debated these
qualities. For example, in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.,195 the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant's search en-
gine's copying of lower resolution thumbnails constituted fair use.
The court held that the new version of the images served a function
novel from the original images; therefore, they were sufficiently trans-
formative and hence fair. And, in Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, the
189. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990).
Judge Leval explains, in weighing "the strength of the secondary user's justification against fac-
tors favoring the copyright owner," courts have to consider whether "the secondary use adds
value to the original-if the quoted matter is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of
new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings." Id.
190. On transformativeness, see Laura A. Heymann, Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use
and Reader Response, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTs 445, 457-66 (2008) (showing that although every-
thing is transformative if examined from the perspective of the reader, this argument highlights
the limits of transformativeness); Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, Kant on Copyright: Rights of Transform-
ative Authorship, 25 CARDOZo ARTS & Ewr. L.J. 1059, 1103 (2008) (arguing that "[a]uthorship is
itself transformative").
191. Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir.
1980).
192. In his comprehensive study, Beebe finds that the commerciality of a use "ha[s] no signifi-
cant influence on the outcome of [a case]." Beebe, supra note 186, at 556.
193. CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc'y of Upper Can. [2004] S.C.R. 339, 54 (Can.).
194. See, e.g., Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
195. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 815 (9th Cir. 2003).
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same court concluded that the transformative nature of Google's use
overrides any commercial aspects of Google's search engine and Web
site.196 Prior to the adoption of the four-factor test, first by the court
and then by the legislature, courts in Israel could not declare similar
uses fair.
Parodies are a good example here. Most parodies are distributed to
the public, and the financial gains to the parodists can sometimes be
significant. However, if they are sufficiently transformative; if they
advance other social values, cultural criticism, and creativity; and if
they are not derived solely out of profit-making motivations,197 they
may enjoy exemption under fair use doctrines. Israeli copyright expe-
rience prior to the 2007 Act made fair use exemptions unavailable for
parodies and satires where the social aspect of the use was secondary
to the commercial aspect. 198 In light of the wording of the first factor
in § 19(b) that does not require a mandatory examination of the com-
mercial nature of the use, balancing between the commercial nature of
a use and its social impact is likely to be less complicated in the future.
While the first factor relates to the later work, the second factor-
the character of the work used-relates to the original work. Here a
court will have to examine whether the work merits protection-
namely, whether it is creative and not a mere idea and whether it is
published or unpublished and, hence, "'closer to the core of intended
copyright protection than are more fact-based works."'199 For exam-
ple, some works, such as the photos of the assassination of President
Kennedy200 or Prime Minister Rabin, are more fact-based and hold
great historical significance. It would be essential to copy them in
their entirety. In addition, the CCH case held that "for the purpose of
196. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). Paul Goldstein
warns us of the danger in decisions like Perfect 10:
[A] slogan or catch phrase will be mistaken for a fair use category. "Transformative
use" is a current, notable example. This concept, that the Court employed in Campbell
v. A cuff-Rose to measure the claims of a particular parody, has become, in cases like ...
Perfect 10 v. Amazon ... , a triumph of mindless sound bite over principled analysis.
Parody is a fair use category; the mere transport of a work intact from one medium to
another-without abridgment or other modification-is not.
Goldstein, supra note 112, at 442.
197. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's
Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
198. See PLA 2687/92 Geva v. Walt Disney Co. 48(1) IsrSC 251 [1993] (Isr.); CA 8393/96
Mifal Hapais v. The Roy Export Est. Co. 54(1) IsrSC 577, 587 [2000] (Isr.). Cf Leibovitz v.
Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998).
199. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820 (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1016
(9th Cir. 2001).
200. See Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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research or private study, it may be essential to copy an entire aca-
demic article or an entire judicial decision." 201
Published works are more likely to qualify as open to fair use.
When unpublished works are at stake, a defendant will find it difficult
to justify fair use. In Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises,
the U.S. Supreme Court created a presumption against fair use of un-
published works.202 In that case, a magazine, The Nation, published a
private manuscript used in former President Gerald Ford's autobiog-
raphy. Despite the newsworthiness of the subject matter, the court
rejected the magazine's claim for fair use because authors should en-
joy the right to control the first publication of their work, which in-
cludes the choice of where and how to publish it. In a similar way, the
Israeli Supreme Court held in the Dead Sea Scrolls Case that the fair
use defense was not available because the defendants violated the au-
thor's right of first publication.203
The third factor-the scope of the work, typically considered the
least important-concerns the question of whether the amount and
substantiality of the part used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole is qualitatively and quantitatively reasonable in relation to the
purpose of the copying. If a defendant has taken an excessive amount
that is not commensurate with the purpose of the use, the use will not
be fair. This third factor "operates on a sliding scale: the more a deal-
ing goes beyond de minimis use, the more likely it goes against fair
use." 204 In most instances, copying the entire work or the verbatim
copying of a substantial part is unfair.205 In the Dead Sea Scrolls Case,
the defendants clearly violated the author's copyright because the en-
tire work was copied and published. In Harper & Row, only 300
words were taken verbatim from a 200,000 word manuscript.206 Nev-
ertheless, this was considered excessive taking because these words
201. CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc'y of Upper Can. [2004] S.C.R. 339, 56 (Can.).
202. See Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). In this case Justice O'Connor
remarked that "[tlhe fact that a work is unpublished is a critical element of its 'nature."' Id. at
564. Furthermore, "[u]nder ordinary circumstances, the author's right to control the first public
appearance of his undisseminated expression will outweigh a claim of fair use." Id. at 555. See
also Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1991); Salinger v. Random House, Inc.,
650 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987). For an example from the
U.K., see Hyde Park Residence Ltd. v. Yelland, [2000] Civ. EWCA 37 (Eng.).
203. See CA 2790, 2811/93 Eisenman v. Qimron (Dead Sea Scrolls Case) 54(3) IsrSC 817
[2000] (Isr.). The question remains, what if the unpublished work is of a great public interest?
In the CCH case, it was held that "if a work has not been published, the dealing may be more
fair in that its reproduction with acknowledgement could lead to a wider public dissemination of
the work." CCH Canadian S.C.R. 339, 1 58.
204. D'Agostino, supra note 145, at 347.
205. See, e.g., Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 1998).
206. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 539.
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constituted the heart of the manuscript, concerning President Ford's
decision to pardon President Richard Nixon. However, in Campbell,
2 Live Crew's use of the line "Pretty woman, walking down the
street"-the heart of the work-was fair use because the rest of the
lyrics were distinctive enough to make the parody they produced suffi-
ciently transformative.207
In other situations, copying the entire work will be the only possibil-
ity and the third factor will not play a decisive role. In Perfect 10, the
court dealt with Google's search engine that displayed thumbnail ver-
sions of Perfect 10 photographs and provided "in-line" links to third
party websites containing full-size versions of the photographs. 208 The
court found that Google's use of the photographs was a highly trans-
formative use, although it merely minimized the original photographs.
In such cases, the courts have to rely on the other three factors to
distinguish between infringement and fair use.
The fourth factor-the impact of the use on the value of the work
and its potential market-requires an evaluation of the actual and po-
tential market harm to the original work caused by the use. The ten-
dency in U.S. courts to treat this factor as the most important one 209
was changed in Campbell, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that
the importance of each factor should be examined on a case-by-case
basis. The Canadian high court likewise reduced the importance of
this factor in CCH. Israeli courts nevertheless still treat this factor as
an important one. 210 Section 19(b) of the 2007 Act refers to harm to
market value and the potential market of the work. Indubitably, dis-
proportionate harm will be caused where a use is directed to a market
similar to that of the original work or where the new work acts as a
substitute for the original. The art of evaluating potential harm is a
difficult task because of the unpredictability of the fair use doctrine.
207. The Court held, "If 2 Live Crew had copied a significantly less memorable part of the
original, it is difficult to see how its parodic character would have come through." Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 588-89 (1994). For similar reasons it was held that Alice
Randell's book The Wind Done Gone was fair use of Gone with the Wind. See SunTrust Bank v.
Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
208. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Kelly v.
Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003); Allen v. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. [1995] 26
O.R. 3d 308 (Can.).
209. In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court stated that the fourth factor was "undoubtedly the
single most important element of fair use." 471 U.S. at 566. Beebe's empirical research shows
the strength of the fourth factor: 59% of courts' opinions explicitly cited this factor. Beebe,
supra note 186, at 617.
210. CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc'y of Upper Can. [2004] S.C.R. 339 (Can.). This factor is
in line with the Berne three-step-test requirement that fair uses must not disproportionately
prejudice the legitimate interests of rightholders or unreasonably affect the normal exploitation
of the work. See Berne Convention, supra note 158, art. 9(2).
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Furthermore, avoiding disproportionate market harm may severely
limit the incentives necessary for creativity. In order to avoid im-
balanced interpretations of the fourth factor, courts will have to re-
main steadfast to the social objectives underlying copyright law.
It is crucial to note that the four factors form a non-exhaustive test.
Section 19(b) provides that "[i]n determining whether a use made of a
work is fair within the meaning of this section the factors to be consid-
ered shall include, inter alia, all of the following." 211 This grants courts
ample space to take into account additional considerations, unspeci-
fied in the 2007 Act, before a use is labeled fair or not. Such unspeci-
fied factors may include the likelihood of market failure,212 the
chilling effect on speech,213 whether the defendant's use was reasona-
ble and necessary in his field of expertise, 214 the age of the work,215
and distributive values.216
In practice, Israeli courts involve other principles of justice and eq-
uity in the process of defining fairness. For example, a fair use claim
will be dismissed if the moral right of the author is infringed. In the
Dead Sea Scrolls Case, the paternity right was infringed since the de-
fendant did not credit the decipherer of the Scrolls in the publica-
tion.217 In another case, a court held that the use of a part of a film in
a documentary program produced by the Israeli Broadcasting Author-
ity infringed the author's moral right because the use was made in a
context that mutilated the creative idea behind the original film. 218
The frequency of the use might also affect the legitimacy of the use.
That is, newspapers are eligible to use materials as long as the use is
informational. However, such use may sometimes exceed the norma-
tivity of fair use and will not be permitted. In addition, the Israeli
211. Copyright Act 2007, 5765-2007, 2007 LSI 34 (Isr.).
212. See Wendy J. Gordon & Daniel Bahls, The Public's Right to Fair Use: Amending Section
107 to Avoid the "Fared Use" Fallacy, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 619, 622-23.
213. See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Breathing Space, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 429
(2007).
214. See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23
CARDOzo ARTs & ENT. L.J. 391, 409-10 (2005).
215. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775 (2003).
216. See, e.g., Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1535 (2005).
217. See CA 2790, 2811/93 Eisenman v. Qimron (Dead Sea Scrolls Case) 54(3) IsrSC 817, 838
[2000] (Isr.). Lastowka suggested adding the provision of credit and attribution as a fifth factor
to the fair use test. See Greg Lastowka, Digital Attribution: Copyright and the Right to Credit, 87
B.U. L. REV. 41, 85 (2007). The CDPA 1988 recognizes the requirement for "sufficient acknowl-
edgement" for the fair dealing defense to apply in certain circumstances. See Copyright, Designs
and Patents Act (CDPA), 1988, c. 48, §§ 29(1)-(1B), 30(1)-(3), 178 (Eng.). See also Pro Sieben
Media v. Carlton Television, [1999] FSR 610, 625 (Eng.).
218. CC 2228/95 Peled v. IBA Dinim Shalom, [1999] 15 (Mag TA) 675 (Eng.).
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experience shows that courts will also resort to principles such as un-
just enrichment 219 and good faith220 when necessary to legitimize fair
use.
VIII. FROM DEFENSES TO RIGHTS
Chapter D indicates that the Israeli legislature aimed to change ex-
isting social tendencies in copyright, to upgrade the general public in-
terest, to secure free speech and democratic dialogue, and to allow
better access to knowledge while maintaining free competition in the
marketplace of ideas. The open-ended nature of the fair use doctrine
along with twelve defined incidents of fair uses for certain purposes 221
raises an inevitable question: whether the fair use doctrine is com-
posed of mere privileges of use,222 a prescription of defenses against
infringement, 223 a list of users' rights in the strict sense of the word, or
a combination of all these aspects.224
Fair use in the 2007 Act is grounded in three different ways: first, in
the "old way," that is, defining permitted uses as non-infringing acts.
For that matter, § 47 provides that "[a] person who does in relation to
a work, any of the acts specified in section 11, or who authorizes an-
other person to perform any such act, without the consent of the copy-
right owner, infringes the copyright, unless such act is permitted
pursuant to the provisions of Chapter D." Second, § 18, which opens
Chapter D, states that the Chapter creates a list of uses that every user
can make without the consent of the rightholder or the payment of
any royalties. Third, § 19 creates an open-ended list of exceptions and
limitations and an open-ended four-factor test to determine the fair-
ness of a given use.
219. See, e.g., CA 5768/94 Ashir Import Prod. & Distribution v. Forum Avisarim & Consump-
tion Prods. 52(4) IsrSC 289 [1998] (Isr.).
220. Another possibility is, as in CCH, to examine possible alternatives for the use in cases
where use of the copyrighted work was not "reasonably necessary to achieve the ultimate pur-
pose." See CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc'y of Upper Can. [2004] S.C.R. 339, 1 57 (Can.).
221. See supra notes 169-85 and accompanying text. It should be noted that the legislature
narrowed the scope of several exceptions in order to limit illegitimate uses. For example, §§ 20
and 21 permit use "to the extent that is justified taking into consideration the purpose of the
aforesaid use." Versions of this condition exist in most provisions. Furthermore, some provi-
sions contain no explanation for the limits they impose. For example, § 22 does not include
incidental use of a musical work: "[T]he deliberate inclusion of a musical work, including its
accompanying lyrics, or of a sound recording embodying such musical work, in another work,
shall be deemed to be an incidental use." Copyright Act 2007, 5768-2007, 2007 LSI 34 (Isr.).
222. See, e.g., Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966).
223. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1163 (9th Cir. 2007); Fisher
v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1986).
224. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 550 (1985).
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Although the explanatory memorandum to the 2007 Act refers to
"interests" and not to "rights," the language used in Chapter D and
the stipulation of §§ 18, 19, and 47 may direct one to think that the
legislature's implicit intention was to elevate the status of the list of
fair uses to that of a list of users' rights. This assumption is supported
by the Israeli Supreme Court's frequent remark that fair use should
not be strictly interpreted. 225
If this proposition is correct, then users' rights in the 2007 Act can
be treated as independent rights. Using Hohfeldian terminology, the
2007 Act created rights for users and not mere privileges or defenses
in cases of infringement. Correlative to the right of a user is the
owner's duty not to bar the former from accessing the said copy-
righted work because "even those who use the word [right] and the
conception 'right' [or claim] in the broadest possible way are accus-
tomed to thinking of 'duty' as the invariable correlative." 226 In this
Article I argue that the 2007 Act has narrowed the scope of authors'
rights, mainly the right of exclusive use and enjoyment, and compels
us to think of the duty of the rightholder to allow use and access to his
works.227 Using the parlance of rights and duties in the context of fair
use is a welcome development. It creates a user-centric normative re-
ality and supports a more flexible problem-solving approach to copy-
right's inherent conflicts.
The inability of copyright laws to secure the public interest has at-
tracted scholarly debate claiming that fair use should be treated as a
list of rights. In their seminal study criticizing the view of copyright as
the law that rewards authors in the guise of property, Ray Patterson
and Stanley Lindberg offer their vision of copyright as A Law of
Users' Rights. 2 2 8 They claim that "users have rights that are just as
225. See, e.g., CA 8393/96 Mifal Hapais v. The Roy Export Est. Co. 54(1) IsrSC 577, 596
[2000] (Isr.).
226. WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEFPIONs 31 (Walter Wheeler
Cook ed., 1919). See also Hohfeld's earlier article Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamen-
tal Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
227. In the words of Waldron,
It is always tempting to take the perspective of the right-bearer, and show what a mar-
velous thing it is for him to have all these rights. They protect and promote his person-
ality. They vindicate his right to the labor of his body. They reward his desert. They
allow him to make plans, and to exercise his autonomy. The virtue of the Hohfeldian
analysis is that it compels us to concentrate on the other side of the coin: the correlative
duty.
Waldron, supra note 90, at 844.
228. L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF
USERS' RIGHTS (1991). See also Elkin-Koren, supra note 151, at 327; D'Agostino, supra note
145, at 309. On the conceptual and legal problems that the concept of users' rights may raise, see
Darren Hudson Hick, Mystery and Misdirection: Some Problems of Fair Use and User's Rights,
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important as those of authors and publishers." 2 2 9 In order to achieve
its constitutionally mandated objectives, the copyright system must
provide "reasonable rights for the users."230 Pamela Samuelson con-
tends that the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976 is in need of reform and
that "[a]dditional work on user rights should be part of a model copy-
right law project." 231 Wendy Gordon and Daniel Bahls likewise claim
that the public should be regarded as a rightholder.232 Courts strug-
gling to define the boundaries of fair use quickly responded to these
calls to reconceptualize fair use.
In CCH, a pro-user judgment, the Supreme Court of Canada
treated users' rights as an integral part of the entitlement structure in
copyright, stating that fair dealings "should not be given a restrictive
interpretation." 233 The court "sought to align itself ... with the more
flexible U.S. approach," 234 just as the Israeli Supreme Court did ear-
lier in the Geva decision. In CCH, the court adopted David Vaver's
argument that "[u]ser rights are not just loopholes. Both owner rights
and user rights should therefore be given the fair and balanced read-
ing that befits remedial legislation." 2 3 5 The court held,
[Rieviewing the scope of the fair dealing exception under the Copy-
right Act, it is important to clarify some general considerations
56 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 485, 485, 500 (2009) (arguing that "the very idea of [users'] rights
is conceptually flawed"). See also Genevieve P. Rosloff, "Some Rights Reserved": Finding the
Space Between All Rights Reserved and the Public Domain, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTs 37, 58 (2009)
(showing that the natural rights approach well balances "between the authors' and users' rights
that more accurately reflects the current theoretical underpinnings of U.S. copyright law").
229. PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 228, at 11.
230. Id. at 14. Scholars criticize the neglected attention users receive in copyright law and
theory. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
347 (2005). She contends that users have four primary purposes of uses: "consumption, commu-
nication, self-development, and creative play." Id. at 370. See also Jessica Litman, Creative
Reading, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175, 183 (2007) (claiming that in copyright we have to pay
more attention to listeners, readers, and viewers and that if we ignore them we are likely to
remain with a copyright system that is out of kilter); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law's Theory of
the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397 (2003) (noting that contemporary copyright law lacks any
"persuasive or coherent theory of the consumer").
231. Pamela Samuelson, Preliminary Thoughts on Copyright Reform, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 551,
566.
232. They suggest a revision of § 107 so that it will recognize that "the fair use of a copy-
righted work ... is a right and not an infringement of copyright." Gordon & Bahls, supra note
212, at 656. See also Jennifer E. Rothman, Liberating Copyright: Thinking Beyond Free Speech,
95 CORNELL L. REV. 463, 463 (2010) (offering an alternative paradigm to the First Amendment
"using the lens of substantive due process and liberty to evaluate users' rights").
The U.S. federal courts have already proclaimed that the public has "a federal right to 'copy
and to use"' what the patent and copyright laws do not recognize as the exclusive realm of the
rightholders. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156 (1989).
233. CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc'y of Upper Can. [20041 S.C.R. 339, 1 54 (Can.).
234. D'Agostino, supra note 145, at 325.
235. DAVID VAVER, COPYRIGHT LAW 171 (2002).
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about exceptions to copyright infringement. Procedurally, a defen-
dant is required to prove that his or her dealing with a work has
been fair; however, the fair dealing exception is perhaps more prop-
erly understood as an integral part of the Copyright Act than simply
a defence. Any act falling within the fair dealing exception will not
be an infringement of copyright. The fair dealing exception, like
other exceptions in the Copyright Act, is a user's right. In order to
maintain the proper balance between the rights of a copyright
owner and users' interests, it must not be interpreted
restrictively. 236
Since the new Israeli Copyright Act went into force in 2007, the
CCH-like users' rights approach has already been made part of
Israel's copyright judicial reality. 237 In one of the pioneering yet con-
troversial decisions based on the 2007 Act, the Tel Aviv District Court
held that the status of users' rights in the 2007 Act has been seriously
strengthened. In Football Ass'n Premier League (FAPL) v. John
Doe2 3 8 the court considered the public's interest under the 2007 Act as
a "right" and held that the identity of the person operating a website
providing video streaming of live sporting events shall not be dis-
closed to the plaintiff, the Premier League.239
The case concerned the streaming of soccer games through the In-
ternet, asking whether it amounts to fair use in the meaning of the
2007 Act. 2 4 0 Judge Michal Agmon-Gonen accepted the position that
certain sporting events have significant cultural and collective social
values and benefits.241 Therefore, although these works are copyright-
able under the 2007 Act, their use is still fair use despite commercial
considerations and potential damage to rightholders.242 The judge
also found support for her decision in the law/norm gap argument,
remarking,
236. CCH Canadian S.C.R. 339, 48.
237. In its recent response to copyright consultations, the The Libraries and Archives Copy-
right Alliance (LACA) in the United Kingdom contends that we must recognize "the impor-
tance of users' rights to the vitality of the copyright regime. These users' rights are enshrined in
the exceptions and limitations to copyright introduced by the Legislator at international, Euro-
pean and national level." The Libraries and Archives Copyright Alliance, @ the Future 1 (Feb. 6,
2009), available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/responses-copyissues-laca.pdf.
238. CC 11646/08 The Football Association Premier League (FAPL) v. John Doe Tak (3)09
(Dist TA) 8372 [2009] (Isr.) (currently under appeal to the Israeli Supreme Court). See also 1
TONY GREENMAN, COPYRIGHT LAW 330-35 (2008) (Heb.).
239. Premier League, (3)09 (Dist TA) 8372.
240. Apart from fair use, the case tackles several major issues, including international jurisdic-
tion over the Internet, the Israeli John Doe procedure, what constitutes copyright infringement,
as well as the sociological importance of sporting events and their availability to the public. The
question of whether Judge Agmon-Gonen went too far in labeling the public as a right-bearer is
awaiting the decision of the Israeli Supreme Court in an appeal submitted in November 2009.
241. Premier League, (3)09 (Dist TA) 8372, at 48.
242. Id. at 31.
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When courts interpret and apply the fair use provision in order to
strike a balance between copyrights and users' rights, they have to
take account of the fact that each and every member of society will
be affected by its interpretation, and ensure that all these people
will not be harmed by a narrow interpretation of their rights. Courts
must be careful not to turn a whole nation to an infringing
nation.243
Chapter D's list is a newcomer in the landscape of copyright law in
Israel. It formally applied the courts' long call to fully recognize the
fair use model as the appropriate standard. Chapter D transformed
the status of the fair dealing doctrine from a provider of defenses
against liability for infringement to that of a storehouse of users'
rights.244 It transformed the fluid and unbalanced relationship be-
tween the public and authors to that of a relationship between
rightholders and dutyholders; it created a list of duties on rightholders
to permit members of the public free access and use of protected,
copyrighted materials. The many theoretical justifications for fair use
legitimize this transformation.
IX. FAIR USE AND JUDICIAL IDEOLOGY
A. Advantageous Ambiguity
That fair use is not a static doctrine is evident from the evolution of
copyright and transplantation of the fair use model in Israel. It has
been crafted in a way that allows courts greater freedom when exercis-
ing their interpretive authority. In Geva, the Israeli Supreme Court
fully utilized its authority to transplant the fair use model245 and in the
recent Premier League case, a district judge was daring enough to de-
clare that the newly enacted fair use standard is a storehouse of users'
rights.246 These decisions do not prescribe a clear and hermetic fair
use test, but was it the intention of the fair use framers to provide a
defined and closed set of incidents for when users can access protected
materials with no permission? The U.S. Congress recognized that
243. Id. at pt. C. Judge Agmon-Gonen supported her argument by John Tehranian's remark
that
[niow, copyright law is of direct importance to the hundreds of millions of individuals
who download music and movies for their iPods, engage in time- and place-shifting with
their TiVos or Slingboxes, own CD or DVD burners, operate their own websites, write
blogs, or have personal pages on MySpace, Facebook, or Friendster.
John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007 UTAH L.
REV. 537, 539.
244. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 151, at 327; see also Dotan et al., supra note 157, at 511. Cf
Parchamovsky & Weiser, supra note 7, at 91 (offering a system of user privileges).
245. See PLA 2687/92 Geva v. Walt Disney Co. 48(1) IsrSC 251 [1993] (Isr.).
246. Football Association Premier League (3)09 (Dist TA) 8372.
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even for the courts that developed the four factor test, the factors
were "in no case definitive or determinative" but rather "provide[d]
some [gauge] for balancing the equities." 247 In Campbell, the U.S. Su-
preme Court wrote that fair use "'permits [and requires] courts to
avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it
would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to fos-
ter." 248 Like the U.S. and Israeli Supreme Courts, their Canadian
counterpart used its interpretive freedom to redefine fairness in copy-
right and promulgated a six-factor test in its landmark CCH deci-
sion.249 These examples show that "[a] well-recognized strength of the
fair use doctrine is the considerable flexibility it provides in balanc-
ing" the competing interests in copyright.250 Using the words of
David Vaver, these examples also show a continuation of a tradition,
dating from nineteenth century U.S. and British practice
of letting judges set and monitor a reasonable balance of rights be-
tween copyright holders and users as different technologies and us-
ages arise and develop. On this theory, while specific targeted
exceptions serve a purpose, legislatures can neither anticipate new
developments nor respond to them effectively and quickly; so courts
are assigned the role of creating appropriate boundaries between
private rights and the public domain in the course of deciding con-
crete disputes. 251
As opposed to the United States, Canada, and Israel, U.K. courts
espouse a stricter view on how courts should interpret and apply the
fair use/fair dealing doctrines. U.K. courts examine the fairness of the
use by referencing parameters that emerged from U.K. case law:2 5 2
whether the work is unpublished, how the work was obtained,253 the
amount taken,254 the use made of the work, 255 the motives for the
dealing,256 the consequence of the dealing,257 and whether the pur-
pose of the use could have been achieved by different means.258 Al-
though these parameters seem ambiguous and non-determinative,
247. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976).
248. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (alteration in original)
(quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)).
249. CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc'y of Upper Can. [2004] S.C.R. 339 (Can.).
250. Samuelson, supra note 7, at 2540.
251. See David Vaver, Canada's Intellectual Property Framework: A Comparative Overview,
17 INTELL. PROP. J. 125, 150 (2004).
252. See BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 121, at 194-96.
253. See Beloff v. Pressdram, [1973] All E.R. 241 (Eng.).
254. See Hubbard v. Vosper, [1972] All E.R. 1023 (Eng.).
255. See Newspaper Licensing Agency v. Marks & Spencer, [2000] A.C. 551 (Eng.).
256. See Hyde Park Residence Ltd. v. Yelland, [2000] EWCA (Civ) 37 (Eng.).
257. See Hubbard, All E.R. at 1023.
258. Hyde Park Residence, EWCA (Civ) at 37.
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Judge Ungoed-Thomas has asserted that fair dealing is a "dealing
which is fair for the approved purposes and not dealing which might
be fair for some other purpose or fair in general." 259 This means, in
other words, that U.K. courts will be expected to restrict their inter-
pretive authority. For example, in Pro Sieben Media v. Carlton Televi-
sion, Judge Laddie held that the fair dealing provisions "are not to be
regarded as mere examples of a general wide discretion vested in the
courts to refuse to enforce copyright where they believe such refusal
to be unfair and reasonable." 260
Leading British intellectual property scholars Bill Cornish and
David Llewellyn provide one explanation for why the U.K. approach
should not adopt the fair use standard: "Judges. . . are not to be fur-
nished with any general tool for criticizing the scope of the legislation.
Their role is confined to interpretation of its meaning." 261 At the
same time, however, U.K. courts do not remain aloof towards social
needs and have encouraged a liberal approach to what constitutes fair
dealing.262 After all, Lord Denning reminded us that "[i]t is impossi-
ble to define what is 'fair dealing." 263 This call to liberally interpret
fair dealing is complemented by an escape clause in the 1988 CDPA
for when public policy matters should override proprietary interests of
copyright owners,264 and also complemented by the 1998 Human
Rights Act requiring courts to consider public interest motives.265
Due to the existence of these sources that enable courts wider inter-
pretive freedom, coupled with the strict view on the role of courts in
interpreting and applying conceptions of fair dealing, calls to adopt a
fair use formula in the U.K. were rejected in the past.2 6 6 The issue of
adopting a general fair use doctrine was canvassed again when the
Gowers Review of Intellectual Property recommended no serious
change to be made to the present state of fair dealing under the
259. Beloff, All E.R. at 262.
260. Pro Sieben AG v. Carlton UK Television Ltd., [1998] FSR 43, 49 (Eng.), rev'd, [1999] 1
W.L.R. 605 (Ct. App.) (Eng.). See generally Jonathan Griffiths, Preserving Judicial Freedom of
Movement-Interpreting Fair Dealing in Copyright Law, 2000 INTELL. PROP. 0. 164.
261. BILL CORNISH & DAVID LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS,
TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS, at pts. 11-38 (2003).
262. See Newspaper Licensing Agency v. Marks & Spencer, [2000] 4 All E.R. 239, 257 (Eng.);
Pro Sieben, 1 W.L.R. at 620; Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd., [2002] Ch. 149, 172 (Eng.).
263. Hubbard v. Vosper, [1972] 2 Q. B. 84, at 93 (Eng.).
264. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (CDPA), 1988, c. 48, § 171(3) (Eng.). See, e.g., Glyn
v. Weston Feature Film Co., [1916] Ch. 261 (Eng.); cf. Stephens v. Avery, [1988] Ch. 45' (Eng.).
265. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 12 (Eng.).
266. The Whitford Committee's recommendation to adopt in the U.K. a fair use formula simi-
lar to the U.S. model was rejected by the government. WHITFORD COMMsrrEE, REPORT ON
COPYRIGHT AND DESIGNs LAw, 1977, at 685 (U.K.). The Committee remarked that a general
fair use doctrine will be vulnerable to "dangers of producing uncertainty and misuse." Id. at 675.
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CDPA. The report suggested updating the closed list by only intro-
ducing new exceptions, such as format shifting,267 caricature and par-
ody,2 68 and a wider exception for libraries and archives. 269
The vague conceptual boundaries of principles such as fairness,
dealing, and the four-factor test, coupled with the nature of fair use
doctrines as fact intensive and case by case, affect the achievement of
legal certainty.270 Apart from the many jurisdictions that have in-
quired into and subsequently rejected the possible adoption of the
U.S. fair use model for lack of certainty and predictability, 271 many
267. GOWERs REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 113, recommendation 8.
268. Id. recommendation 12.
269. Id. recommendation 10(a). In a later review of these recommendations, the Intellectual
Property Office announced that the legislative proposals regarding fair dealing will focus on
"educational provisions, preservations by libraries and archives, and fair dealing for research and
private study purposes." U.K. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, TAKING FORWARD THE
GOWERs REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: SECOND STAGE CONSULTATION ON COPYRIGHT
EXCEPTIONS 5 (2010). See also id. Annex A, at 47-53 (presenting a draft of The Copyright
Permitted Acts Amendment Regulations 2010). The review also provides that the exceptions
offered by the Gowers Report on format shifting (private copying) and parody should be ex-
amined within an EU context about a broad exception for non-commercial use. U.K. INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, supra, at 2-3. See also Ronan Deazley, Copyright and Parody: Taking
Backward the Gowers Review? 73 MOD. L. REV. 785, 807 (2010) (a broad exception for non-
commerical use "would hardly function as a satisfactory alternative to the introduction of a be-
spoke exception for parody").
270. In 2008 the U.K. Intellectual Property Office took the first stage consultations relating to
the Gowers Review. In its report it rejected the possibility of adopting a fair use mechanism
because, among other things, "[i]dentifying where the boundaries should lie is critical in ensuring
that our copyright system remains fit for today's world. A system of strong rights, accompanied
by limited exceptions, will provide a framework that is valued by and protects right holders and
is both understood and respected by users." U.K. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, supra note
269, at 1-2.
In a recent comment to the U.K. Independent Review of Intellectual Property and Growth,
the Motion Pictures Association commented that "ft]he UK and European regulatory approach
is not the same [as the United States] and it would not necessarily be easy or beneficial to
transpose the US approach to a foreign context, even if the Fair Use doctrine had theoretical
appeal." UNITED KINGDOM INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GROWTH:
COMMENTS OF THE MOTION PICTURE AssoCIATION 13 (Mar. 4, 2011), available at http://
www.ipo.gov.uklipreview-c4e-sub-motion.pdf.
271. The Australian government's paper "Fair Use and Other Copyright Exceptions" consid-
ered the adoption of a fair use formula in the Copyright Act. This suggestion was rejected for
various reasons including the impossibility of distinguishing between infringement and fair use,
the expenses involved in defending a fair use claim in court, and the risk to existing business and
licensing arrangements. See Fair Use and Other Copyright Exceptions: An Examination of Fair
Use, Fair Dealing and Other Exceptions in the Digital Age (Issues Paper 2005).
In its review of copyright law, the New Zealand government also considered fair use, but
identified significant problems associated with this possibility. These included the fragility of the
country's small marketplace, noncompliance with the three-step test of the Berne Convention,
and the uncertain character of the doctrine. See Digital Technology and the Copyright Act 1994
(Internal Working Paper 2002).
The issue of replacing fair dealing with fair use in Canada was recently raised by the latest
round of copyright consultations announced by the Canadian government. This issue was also
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U.S. scholars argue that the doctrine is indeed a host to too many
conceptual and normative problems. David Nimmer wrote that the
four factors are so unclear that "had Congress legislated a dartboard
rather than the particular four fair use factors . . . it appears that the
upshot would be the same." 272 Lawrence Lessig described the fair use
doctrine as an "astonishingly bad" system amounting to little more
than "the right to hire a lawyer." 273 Wendy Gordon reiterated that
the doctrine is "indeed ill."274 Michael Madison claimed that the doc-
trine "has become too many things to too many people to be of much
specific value to anyone." 275 Gideon Parchomovsky and Kevin
Goldman observed that "fair use is at once the most important and
the most 'troublesome' doctrine in copyright law.... [T]he case law is
characterized by widely divergent interpretations of fair use, divided
courts, and frequent reversals." 276 And Barton Beebe recently la-
beled the doctrine "the most important-and amorphous-limitation"
on rightholders.277 The unpredictable nature of the fair use doctrine
resulted in "commonplace" reversals and divided courts,278 and, as
William Fisher and William McGeveran found, it may bring members
of the education sector to avoid copies of copyrighted materials for
raised in the past. In 1985 the Canadian Sub-Committee on the Revision of Copyright specifi-
cally rejected replacing fair dealing with fair use. Two main reasons were raised: the Canadian
experience had worked very well and the U.S. experience had shown that a general clause for
fair dealings is not a desirable legal tool. The problems of lack of certainty and predictability
and possible noncompliance with international obligations under the Berne Convention and
TRIPs were not absent from the report. See generally Barry Sookman & Dan Glover, Why
Canada Should Not Adopt Fair Use: A Joint Submission to the Copyright Consultations, 22 IN-
TELL. PROP. J. 29 (2009). Cf. Michel Geist, Designing a Copyright Bill That's Built to Last,
TORONTO STAR, Aug. 17, 2009, at B2.
Finally, in its 2008 Green Paper on "Copyright in the Knowledge Economy," the European
Commission did not even revisit the question of whether to adopt a fair use system. Rather, it
proposed refining the existing exceptions on the InfoSoc Directive's closed list. COMMISSION OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, GREEN PAPER: COPYRIGHT IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY
(2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/copyright/docs/copyright-infso/green
paperen.pdf.
272. David Nimmer, "Fairest of Them All" and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 280 (2003).
273. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW
To LOCK DowN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 187 (2004).
274. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use: Threat or Threatened?, 55 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 903, 912
(2005).
275. Madison, supra note 214, at 397.
276. Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483,
1484-86 (2007).
277. Beebe, supra note 186, at 551.
278. Leval, supra note 189, at 1106-07.
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classroom use while these uses are permitted by the Act.279 A copy-
right culture based on confusion or fear is definitely not what the
framers of fair use doctrines envisioned. 280 Furthermore, the lack of
legal certainty is such that it can put jurisdictions in violation of their
international obligations.281
Should these visions of fair use direct us to conclude that courts'
interpretive authority should be limited-that owners and users of
copyrighted materials should negotiate over and enter into contracts
specifying permitted uses-or should we just announce that fair use
doctrines are "especially unstable" 282 or "not working"? 283 Are we
now stuck with an Israeli version of a "botched job" 2 84 like § 107285
and should we eagerly wait for the courts to make the best of what we
have?
First, leaving the determination of fair uses to the market is not a
desirable option. Fair uses are not negotiable commodities. They are
rights that the law deems not to infringe copyright and which are be-
stowed on the public for the many theoretical and economic reasons
discussed above. Converting fair uses to negotiable commodities
amounts to the transformation of the doctrine to something resem-
279. William W. Fisher & William McGeveran, The Digital Learning Challenge: Obstacles to
Educational Uses of Copyrighted Material in the Digital Age (Berkman Center for Internet &
Society, Pub. Research No. 2006-09, 2006).
In his recent inquiry into fair use, Jason Mazzone remarks that
[t]he failure of Congress and of the courts to provide clear guidance on the meaning of
fair use permits copyright owners to leverage the vagueness of the law and persuade
prospective users that virtually any unauthorized use constitutes copyright infringe-
ment-and that if the use is not paid for it will result in a lawsuit and substantial
damages.
Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 395, 395 (2009).
280. See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116
YALE L.J. 882 (2007) (showing how fair users are requested to pay for licenses in order to avoid
subsequent litigation). See also Parchamovsky & Weiser, supra note 7, at 100 (users "will always
prefer to take less than what they perceive to be the permissible amount and will be sheltered
from liability"). This consequence is best captured in the words of Michael Carroll claiming that
the fair use doctrine is "so case-specific that it offers precious little guidance about its scope to
artists, educators, journalists, Internet users, and others who require use of another's copy-
righted expression in order to communicate effectively." Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85
N.C. L. REv. 1087, 1090 (2007).
281. See Herman C. Jehoram, Restrictions on Copyright and Their Abuse, 27 E.I.P.R. 359
(2005). Jehoram argues that "the open American 'fair use' system in fact violates the Berne
Convention with its specific restrictions which serve to guarantee the rights of authors and the
interests of users by providing them with legal certainty." Id. at 360.
282. Beebe, supra note 186, at 574.
283. Mazzone, supra note 279, at 395.
284. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REv.
1137, 1151 (1990).
285. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
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bling a Lockean state of nature for fair uses: a pre-political arrange-
ment in which "every one has the Executive Power of the Law of
Nature." 286 In this state, men "have an uncontrollable Liberty, to dis-
pose of his Person or Possessions. "287 In this situation, only the eco-
nomically strong will survive and dictate to the entire community how
fair uses should be applied. Second, announcing that fair use doc-
trines do not work is a simplistic conclusion that signals no direction
towards an alternative way. Until an alternative to the present formu-
lation of fair use doctrines would be accepted and proved workable,
discussions on foreclosing fair use or the doctrine's unlikelihood to
survive "is a dangerous direction for copyright law." 288 Courts should
play a decisive role in the development of the doctrine and its deriva-
tive norms, as well as its ethical vision and boundaries.
I agree that calls to rethink fair use doctrines for their lack of cer-
tainty and predictability are not without standing. However, deval-
uing fair use for lack of predictability, as much as it may sound
legitimate, ignores a fact we all know; the fact that, as Timothy En-
dicott suggested, predictability is not a problem unique to copyright.
Rather, "[p]redictability in the law is to some extent unattainable ,"289
and "vague language cannot be eliminated from the law." 290 Limiting
the interpretive authority of courts due to the generality and ambigu-
ity of the doctrine carries the risk of sending wrong and indeterminate
signals to the copyright community. Arguably, the copyright commu-
nity needs best practices in fair use,291 an arbitration system for users
who cannot negotiate a license from the owner of the copyrighted
work,292 a recognition of users' right to hack digital codes, 293 specific
286. LOCKE, supra note 68, at 293 (emphasis omitted).
287. Id. at 288-89.
288. Gordon & Bahls, supra note 212, at 620.
289. TIMOTHY A. 0. ENDICOTr, VAGUENESS IN LAw 4 (2000) (emphasis added).
290. Id. at 189.
291. See D'Agostino, supra note 145, at 354-58. See also Dotan et al., supra note 157, at 447
(discussing the process of building a Code of Fair Use Best Practices for the use of copyrighted
materials in Higher Education Institutions in Israel); Michael J. Madison, Some Optimism About
Fair Use and Copyright Law, 57 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 351 (2010) (supporting the model
of best practices and arguing that law reform in copyright is not exclusively a matter for public
authorities).
An alternative, which does not dismiss the idea of "best practices," was offered by Pamela
Samuelson and the members of the Copyright Principles Project (CPP). They offer a mechanism
of "opinion letters" according to which "Individuals or firms considering whether a contem-
plated use of a copyrighted work would qualify as a fair use could submit a request to the Copy-
right Office for an opinion." See Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project:
Directions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 31 (2011), available at http://www.law.berkeley.
edu/files/bcltCPP.pdf.
292. See generally David Nimmer, A Modest Proposal to Streamline Fair Use Determinations,
24 CARDozo ARTS & ENr. L.J. 11 (2006).
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safe harbors that indicate amounts of permissible copying, 294 a re-
structuring of consumers' use privileges,295 a low-cost administrative
tribunal that provides indication on whether a putative use is fair or
not, or an administrative agency responsible for generating regula-
tions that determine what constitutes fair use in specific contexts.296
Some would even consider it appropriate to wait for the legislature to
react to market conditions by adding new exceptions, despite the costs
of delayed reactions. 297 In the 2007 Act the Israeli legislature offers
an additional alternative. Section 19(c) authorizes the minister to
"make regulations prescribing conditions under which a use shall be
deemed a fair use." Before any of these recommendations reach ma-
turity and gain international recognition,298 the copyright community
needs to accept the following two propositions: first-for those who
think it is amorphous and uncertain-that "unpredictable as it might
be, the fair use doctrine at least seems the best defense we have
against copyright becoming tyrannical and oppressive. . .";299 and sec-
ond, courts should be expected to use the interpretive authority fair
use doctrines give them in order to overcome undesirable conse-
quences and guide owners and users of copyrighted materials on when
a use is fair.
Two arguments for vagueness in law and against wrong assessment
and categorization of fair use cases further strengthen the above pro-
positions. The argument for vagueness recognizes that vague legal
concepts are vulnerable to fierce criticism as they provide no particu-
lar prescription for their application. However, conceptual vulnerabil-
ity is sometimes an advantage in the law, not a deficit. We tend to
293. Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1089 (1998).
294. See Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 276, at 1483. In their attempt to eliminate
uncertainty in fair use, Parchomovsky and Goldman recommend bright-line quantitative safe
harbors for certain types of appropriation. For example, they argue that "for any literary work
consisting of at least one hundred words, the lesser of fifteen percent or three hundred words
may be copied without the permission of the copyright holder." Id. at 1511.
295. See Parchamovsky & Weiser, supra note 7, at 95 (claiming that "the fair use doctrine
must be supplemented with a system of . . . 'use privileges' or 'user privileges'-i.e., privileges
that will dramatically increase the range of permissible uses of copyrighted content in digital
media").
296. See Mazzone, supra note 279, at 395.
297. See GOWERs REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 113; see also Sookman &
Glover, supra note 271, at 29.
298. Reaching international recognition, D'Agostino remarks, is unlikely to be too difficult:
"While Canada and the United Kingdom appear to have a rigid 'fair dealing' framework, and the
United States appears to have a more flexible structure in fair use, the legal outcomes in the
three jurisdictions have been for the most part similar." D'Agostino, supra note 145, at 356.
299. Hick, supra note 228, at 500.
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search for definitive answers and, as Jeremy Waldron observes, make
serious attempts to
determine a precise prescriptive meaning for legal and constitu-
tional provisions. Our urge is to get into a position where we can
always answer the question, "Well, is this prohibited or is it not?"
However, sometimes the point of a legal provision may be to start a
discussion rather than settle it . . . .3oo
Legal outcomes are created in a social and cultural context. In
modern and free societies, legal principles are not detached from so-
cial reality. In other words, "[iln any decent legal system there is a
fairly clear answer to the question 'What is regulated?,"' but lesser
clarity will meet us when trying to answer the question "What ought to
be regulated?"301 Fair use is an open-ended doctrine. Due to its
vagueness, it suffers from conceptual vulnerability.30 2 However, it is a
platform grounded in law to start a discussion, not a definitive pre-
scription structured to guide a set of anticipated behaviors. In this lies
one of its greatest economic and social advantages that will protect the
durability and consistency of its development.303
Concepts that are open in character, such as fair use, are generally
"essentially contested."a3  They provide a wider scope for the devel-
opment of different and competing conceptions. Gallie coined the
term "essentially contested concepts," according to which there are
certain concepts, such as art, democracy, and property,305 "the proper
use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper
300. Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues, 82 CALIF.
L. REv. 509, 539 (1994).
301. ENDICOTr, supra note 289, at 196 (emphasis added).
302. See, e.g., Parchamovsky & Goldman, supra note 276, at 1496 ("[I]t is now virtually impos-
sible to predict the outcome of fair use cases.").
303. It is not highly unlikely that the fair use standard will be replaced again in the future with
an even wider provision. Perhaps, when the new Act will celebrate its jubilee, research examin-
ing fair use in Israeli courts will reach a conclusion that § 19(b) could have been drafted as a one-
sentence provision similar to the U.S. 1965 draft version: "Notwithstanding the provisions of
§ 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work is not an infringement of copyright." H.R. 11947, H.R.
12345, S. 3008, 88th Cong. (1964). Then the legislature-given the anticipation of extending
even further the imbalance between technological developments, social needs, and legal re-
form-might consider replacing the fair use model with this one-sentence provision.
304. W. B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, in 56 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN
SOCIETY 167, 167 (1956). See also Alasdair MacIntyre, The Essential Contestability of Some
Social Concepts, 84 ETHICS 1 (1973); Waldron, supra note 300, at 509; Lior Zemer, The Concep-
tual Game in Copyright, 28 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 409 (2006).
305. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, The Distributive Foundation of Corrective Justice, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 138, 147-48 (1999) ("Property is an essentially contested concept that is open to competing
interpretations and permutations."); Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property:
Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667, 1688 (1988) (treating
property as an essentially contested concept).
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uses on the part of their users." 306 For Gallie, "essential" means three
things. First, it indicates contestation-to-the-core of the concept: the
concept is embedded with anomalies and disagreements which gener-
ate conceptual patterns that stagger the very heart of the concept.
Second, it requires contestedness to serve part of the very definition
of the concept under scrutiny. And third, in the absence of the com-
ponent "essential," the concept may lack sufficient contestability and
may lose its "open" character. The ample disagreements on how to
approach fair use-both ideologically and legally-and the aggressive
criticism directed towards the doctrine's wide interpretive boundaries,
all show that fair use, as a concept, presents contestation-to-the-core.
This allows conceptual and doctrinal inventions in fair use to maintain
their diverse and open character.307
I agree that fair use controversies are not all resolvable, and it
seems that scholars will-especially in the wake of new digital tech-
nologies or debates on whether "fair use is dead"30 8-continue to dis-
agree on a preferred conception of fair use. Still, the argument of
"void for vagueness" with regards to fair use is misleading and norma-
tively wrong. Fair use is a doctrinal concept open in character. Not all
legal principles and doctrines ought be determinative. The open na-
ture of a legal provision is not a flaw. H.L.A. Hart once remarked
that "[i]t is a feature of the human predicament ... the impossibility of
foreseeing all possible combinations of circumstances that the future
may bring. . . . This means that all legal rules and concepts are
'open'. . . ."309 Flexible legal rules then are desirable.310 The open
306. Gallie, supra note 304, at 169.
307. The nature of fairness as an essentially contested concept is best explained by Ronald
Dworkin, who takes fairness as an example of a concept and explains,
The difference is a difference not just in the detail of the instructions given but in the
kind of instructions given. When I appeal to the concept of fairness I appeal to what
fairness means, and I give my views on that issue no special standing. When I lay down
a conception of fairness, I lay down what I mean by fairness, and my view is therefore
the heart of the matter. When I appeal to fairness I pose a moral issue; when I lay down
my conception of fairness I try to answer it.
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 135 (1977).
308. See Gordon, supra note 274, at 909 (challenging the argument that "fair use is dead" and
remarking that "[w]hile fair use is in danger from the DMCA and developments in contract law,
I am not yet prepared to pronounce fair use to be dead").
309. H.L.A. HART, Jhering's Heaven of Concepts and Modern Analytical Jurisprudence, in
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 265, 269-70 (1983).
310. As discussed above, an integrated philosophy of copyright is also desired. We should not
confine openness to legal provisions only. Contestation with regard to the underlying theory of
copyright has many advantages. In that respect, Madhavi Sunder wrote,
We should not fear the rise of new theoretical justifications for creating intellectual
property rights-or for limiting them. There is much to be gained from articulating
competing descriptive and normative visions of intellectual property, particularly those
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character and contestable nature of the fair use doctrine will ensure
future improvements of the concept of fair use and its capacity to
meet unpredictable social and cultural challenges. The Israeli legisla-
ture enacted the judicially transplanted fair use doctrine exactly for
these reasons-to avoid freezing the copyright system. Put simply, the
nature of fair use-its essential contestability-makes it a better con-
cept. Contestability, as Gray remarks, intends to "enrich intellectual
life and to promote tolerance within it"311 as well as to highlight mis-
conceptions and flaws that would otherwise be left untouched. In
Gallie's words, "Recognition of a given concept as essentially con-
tested implies recognition of rival uses of it" and "[o]ne very desirable
consequence of the required recognition in any proper instance of es-
sential contestedness might therefore be expected to be a marked rais-
ing of the level of quality of arguments in the disputes of the
contestant parties." 312
The argument against wrong assessment and categorization of fair
use has been recently developed by Pamela Samuelson. She invited
both commentators and judges to "stop wringing their hands about
how troublesome fair use law is and look instead for common patterns
in the fair use caselaw." 313 True, fair use is not free of defects. How-
ever, despite these defects, fair use, she poignantly shows, does not
lack the certainty and predictability for which it was heavily criticized:
[F]air use law is both more coherent and more predictable than
many commentators have perceived once one recognizes that fair
use cases tend to fall into common patterns, or what [her article
calls] policy-relevant clusters. The policies underlying modern fair
use law include promoting freedom of speech and of expression, the
ongoing progress of authorship, learning, access to information,
truth telling or truth seeking, competition, technological innovation,
and privacy and autonomy interests of users. If one analyzes puta-
tive fair uses in light of cases previously decided in the same policy
cluster, it is generally possible to predict whether a use is likely to
be fair or unfair.314
Unbundling fair uses into the proposed policy-relevant clusters is
not an immediate cure to all the defects associated with a general con-
that challenge the historical distribution of the power to make and control cultural
meaning.
Sunder, supra note 2, at 332.
311. John Gray, On Liberty, Liberalism and Essential Contestability, 8 BRIT. J. POL. Sci. 385,
389 (1978). See also John N. Gray, On the Essential Contestability of Social and Political Con-
cepts, 5 POL. THEORY 331 (1977).
312. Gallie, supra note 304, at 193.
313. Samuelson, supra note 7, at 2621.
314. Id. at 2541-42.
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cept invented to guide society's authorial behavior. But, such "un-
bundling will provide courts with a more useful and nuanced tool kit
for dealing with the plethora of plausible fair uses."3t 5 Fair use doc-
trines are flexible. They allow courts to protect the constant evolution
of the public interest and adapt to other social needs in the wake of
new digital platforms that invent new markets and opportunities.316
The generality of fair use has another advantage in a state such as
Israel. As a relatively young and demographically small state that is
still developing its legal system, judicial guidance is critical for the de-
sign of a copyright system commensurate with the realities of Israel as
a culturally heterogeneous polity and the need to preserve the values
that define the state's democratic ideals. The 2005 Explanatory Mem-
orandum to the Copyright Bill indicates that the transplantation of the
fair use doctrine was intended to avoid stagnation in copyright and
fair use by providing courts greater interpretive freedom to resolve
unforeseen uses.317 Moreover, as opposed to other parts of the Brit-
ish Empire, the Israeli legislature was very late in its response to copy-
right changes. It took the Israeli legislature six decades to enact a new
copyright law, despite debating it for half of that period. Late re-
sponses by legislatures create gaps in legal systems. These gaps im-
pose adverse detrimental effects on rapidly changing markets, such as
the market for intellectual properties. The Israeli Supreme Court's
experience in filling in these gaps proves that it is the appropriate pub-
lic organ to ensure adequate application of the fair use model "in the
context of a recognized social or cultural pattern." 318
The Israeli Supreme Court delivered decisions on fair use in only a
handful of cases. Despite this, the fair use jurisprudence of the court
315. Id. at 2543.
316. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other Copyrightable
Works in Digital Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob and Sega, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 49
(1993).
317. Family and Entertainment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat. 218 (codified at 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2006)). Similarly, the legislative history of the 1976 U.S. Copyright Act also indi-
cates that Congress did not want to produce an Act that would freeze the law of fair use. The
House Report provides,
The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but
there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of
rapid technological change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use
is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine
to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976). See also Samuelson, supra note 7, at 2602-15.
318. Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1525, 1623 (2004). Lloyd Weinreb also suggested that societal acceptance of what is fair use
should inform fair use analysis. See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair Use, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1291,
1296, 1301, 1306-10 (1999); see also Weinreb, supra note 284, at 1138-40, 1150-53.
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shows that it did not remain indifferent towards the need to develop
standards of fairness in copyright and draw benefits from the nature of
the doctrine as essentially contestable. The court did not apply the
fair use formula transplanted in Geva as-in the words of Judge Pos-
ner-"an algorithm that enables decisions to be ground out mechani-
cally." 319 This judicial attitude is best captured by the words of the
former President of the Israeli Supreme Court, Aharon Barak, ad-
dressing his vision of the two primary concerns of every supreme
court: "bridging the gap between law and society, and protecting de-
mocracy." 320 Given the importance of copyright to democratic dis-
courses and processes in every civil society,321 courts are expected to
develop norms and principles that will be as precise as possible, yet
flexible, in order to guide-and where relevant, adjust and change-
copyright behavior.
B. Ideology and Adjudication
On the one hand, contemporary debates on the success of fair use
doctrines criticize the effectiveness of the courts' interpretations and
applications in guiding or changing the behavior of copyright commu-
nities. On the other hand, if we look at fair use from the lens of pol-
icy-clusters, the strength of the criticism becomes questionable.
Whichever view one supports, one of the main reasons for these con-
flicting views and ongoing debates regarding the success of the present
formulation of the doctrine is the fact that, unlike other legal fields,322
interpretations of fair use do not involve as much ideology in legal
rulings as one would expect.323 In a recent study, Barton Beebe raises
the following question: "Is copyright fair use . .. a non-ideological or
319. Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 2003).
320. Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116
HARV. L. REV. 16, 28 (2002).
321. See Netanel, supra note 89, at 288 (defining copyright as "in essence a state measure that
uses market institutions to enhance the democratic character of civil society").
322. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and the
Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257
(1995); Ward Farnsworth, Signatures of Ideology: The Case of the Supreme Court's Criminal
Docket, 104 MICH. L. REV. 67 (2005); Youngsik Lim, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court
Justices' Decision Making, 29 J. LEGAL STuD. 721 (2000); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental
Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997).
323. See Barton Beebe, Does Judicial Ideology Affect Copyright Fair Use Outcomes?: Evi-
dence from the Fair Use Case Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 517, 522 (2008). On the role of
ideology in judicial reasoning, see, for example, Barak, supra note 320, at 19; Richard A. Posner,
Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31 (2005); Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn
& Lee Epstein, The Median Justice on the United States Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275
(2005); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the
Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1377 (1998).
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at least 'ideologically ambiguous' area of American law?" 3 2 4 Some
would expect judges, when dealing with fair use claims, to involve in
their rulings a greater ideological flavor or their partisan preferences.
However, empirical findings have brought Beebe to conclude that
"copyright fair use is not an area of the law in which judicial ideology
appears to influence adjudication . . . [and] copyright fair use is an
exception to [scholars'] more general findings that judicial ideology
affects intellectual property outcomes, at least before the [U.S.] Su-
preme Court." 325
More than a decade ago, James Boyle highlighted the need to create
"politics of intellectual property" in order to "prevent the formation
and rigidification of a set of rules crafted by and for the largest intel-
lectual property holders." 326 Ideology in copyright means many
things, such as preferences and political visions, the accumulated wis-
dom of general theories affecting cultural exchange, social productiv-
ity, liberty, free speech and democratic values. We saw that the Israeli
Supreme Court is attentive to these values and open towards consid-
eration of various philosophical approaches. So far, however, this at-
tention was limited and less successful than hoped for in creating a
solid Israeli "intellectual property politics" that more adequately pro-
tects the rights of the public and its members.
If we take copyright seriously and consider fair use a mediating
norm between private and public interests and between obstacles to
democratic dialogue, human expression, and property rights, then
Beebe's findings are indeed disturbing. True,
[i]t may be encouraging to learn that copyright fair use is not an
area of the law in which judicial ideology appears to influence adju-
dication . . . . Yet, one might tentatively observe that there is also
something disturbing about these results. They are disturbing be-
cause copyright fair use should be ideological. . . .Fair use outcomes
define the contours of the private and public domains of human ex-
pression and, in doing so, directly impact our capability for human
flourishing. Fair use is far more than an economic area of the law
calling for the post-ideological balancing of costs and benefits; it
goes to the core of what constitutes a good society.327
The 2007 Israeli Copyright Act, Hanoch Dagan contends, renewed
the property institution of copyright, an institution that serves a multi-
plicity of competing interests and values, an institution that aims to
324. Beebe, supra note 323, at 519.
325. Id. at 522.
326. James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE
L.J. 87, 113 (1997).
327. Beebe, supra note 323, at 522.
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advance the fundamental public interest of allowing members of the
public to be exposed to and consume copyrighted cultural and social
commodities while securing protection for private and personal aspi-
rations of creative laborers.328 The success of this renewed institution
is dependent on the ability of copyright systems to depart and emanci-
pate society from the chains of rigid principles of property and owner-
ship and from the dogmatic application of legislative doctrines. The
success of this renewed institution requires courts to invite ideological
reasoning to their interpretation of fair use.
The lack of sufficient judicial and ideological involvement in the de-
velopment of clear fair use doctrines perhaps explains why, to date,
only thirty-three cases in Israeli courts have dealt with fair use and
why the defense was allowed in only five of these cases.329 It is only
when courts will accept that "[a]uthorship as embedded in copyright
law is an ideology, first and foremost, in the basic sense of this
term,"330 and not primarily an economic tool signifying the proprie-
tary ambitions of creative individuals, that they will be able to revisit
fair use in light of the objectives and values that triggered its inven-
tion. The 2007 Copyright Act provides Israeli courts with a powerful
and socially oriented legislative tool, with which they can, and should,
develop a stronger social and ethically balanced agenda for the copy-
right community.
X. FAIR USE AND GLOBAL JUDICIAL SIGNALING
A. Judicial Signaling
When courts transplant foreign copyright standards, they project
something in addition to the message sent to legislatures for their lack
of action. Courts signal to the local and international communities
their social and legal commitment to adjust ill-defined laws. The early
court-made fair use standard in the Geva case331 in Israel and the de-
parture from the natual law approach as a justification to copyright 332
is an example of judicial signaling. Judges use signaling to show their
involvement in shaping the system's cultural and legal identity,3 3 3 the
328. Hanoch Dagan, A Property-Based Reading: The Renewed Property Institution of Copy-
right, in AUTHORING RIGHTS: READINGS IN COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 66, at 39 (Heb.).
329. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 151, at 354.
330. Bracha, supra note 2, at 266.
331. PLA 2687/92 Geva v. Walt Disney Co. 48(1) IsrSC 251 [1993] (Isr.).
332. See supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text; see also supra Part VI.
333. Signaling is used by judges to convey not only their ideological preferences but also the
outcome of future cases in order to actively shape their dockets. See, e.g., VANESSA A. BAIRD,
SHAPING THE JUDICIAL AGENDA: JUSTICES' PRIORITIES AND LITIGANT STRATEGIEs (2006);
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system's affiliation with a particular ideology, and the system's willing-
ness to cooperate and establish a long-term334 dialogue with certain
norm-donors. In addition to the courts, many legal systems communi-
cate in this way and signal their willingness to accept different norms
in exchange for protecting the rights of their own people. Courts take
part in achieving these goals. For example, Japan passed tobacco-con-
trol laws to signal its conformity with Western norms and to project its
"civilized" nature;33 5 the U.S. Congress adopted the European term
protection in copyright under the CTEA in order for American au-
thors and artists to receive similar terms of protection as their Euro-
pean counterparts.33 6 The latter is an example of global judicial
signaling where the Supreme Court approved the constitutionality of
the CTEA, signaling the U.S. commitment to consider and follow
norms of copyright of other legal systems.337
As with every legal system that adheres to the norms of another
system, signaling is also a culturally risky act. It can be seen as either
a pure act of legal transplantation demonstrating the system's open-
ness towards foreign standards, but it may also be perceived as an act
of weakness, showing the system's inability to create its own legal cul-
ture.3 38 In the early days of the independent State of Israel, the eclec-
tic and heterogeneous nature of Israeli law was a cause of concern.
The system was a hybrid of Islamic, French, and English norms3 3 9 -a
system with "a degree of multiple influences rarely encountered in
any other legal system . . . [;] an extremely heterogeneous system
wherein enactments from different worlds are to be found in the same
statute book" with hardly any evidence of "organic affinity or connec-
tion." 340 The young state was aware of conveying the wrong impres-
Tonja Jacobi, The Judicial Signaling Game: How Judges Shape Their Dockets, 16 Sup. CT. ECON.
REV. 1 (2008).
334. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMs 5 (2000).
335. See, e.g., Eric A. Feldman, The Culture of Legal Change: A Case Study of Tobacco Con-
trol in Twenty-First Century Japan, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 743 (2006); David Nelken, Comment,
Signaling Conformity: Changing Norms in Japan and China, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 933 (2006).
336. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(1998).
337. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). Here Justice Ginsburg found that the Congress
acted within its powers and that "[b]y extending the baseline United States copyright term to life
plus 70 years, Congress sought to ensure that American authors would receive the same copy-
right protection in Europe as their European counterparts." Id. at 204-08.
338. As Assaf Likhovski remarked, "A nation that mimics the laws of another nation is usu-
ally seen as being at a lower stage of cultural development." Likhovski, supra note 148, at 648.
339. See, e.g., ASSAF LIKHOvsKI, LAW AND IDENTITY IN MANDATE PALESTINE (2006).
340. David M. Sassoon, Comment, The Israel Legal System, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 405, 405
(1968). See also Uri Yadin, Sources and Tendencies of Israel Law, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 561, 564
(1951).
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sion of "self-denying ability" 341 to legislate and create its own legal
culture. Consequently, the preferred way was a piecemeal method of
legislation and judicial transplantation alongside the development of
local norms and standards-namely, of "laboriously comparing texts
and solutions, picking and choosing, and occasionally adding alto-
gether new elements." 342
Choosing a method of borrowing from other legal systems is an-
other way for young states to signal their intention to join in the global
community in a given field. It took Israel six decades to change Impe-
rial copyright laws inherited from the British Mandate. Courts were
entrusted with the job of adjusting copyright law, signaling to the in-
ternational community Israel's recognition of prevailing-and contro-
versial343-copyright norms, and its preference to be affiliated with a
particular school of thought-the American utilitarian approach to
copyright and its fair use model.3 4 4 The active role of courts in Israel
in shaping and refining copyright laws shows that young democratic
countries have much to share with systems possessing a well-estab-
lished historic legal tradition.
341. Benjamin Akzin, Codification in a New State: A Case Study of Israel, 5 AM. J. Comp. L.
44, 53 (1956).
342. Id. at 66. See also S. Ginossar, Israel Law: Components and Trends, 1 ISR. L. REV. 380,
395 (1966) (arguing that Israeli law aimed to become "[f]ree from the bias of narrow-minded
nationalism").
343. See CC 11646/08 The Football Association Premier League v. John Doe Tak (3)09 (Dist
TA) 8372 [2009] (Isr.).
344. American influences on Israeli law are not confined to legal reforms only. Law schools
in Israel largely resemble their American counterparts. See, e.g., Lahav, supra note 26, at 653.
This practice produces a legal profession that finds American law the most reliable and ap-
proachable foreign source. Given this reliance it is anticipated that the transplantation of Amer-
ican legal principles and departure from Continental principles in Israeli law will only increase.
Indeed, a pioneering research study found that the Israeli Supreme Court consistently applies
foreign sources. While civil law and international law accounted for a marginal part of citations
(on average 0.5% and 0.1% respectively), common law sources accounted for an average of
20.9% of the total cases examined. Yoram Shachar, Ron Harris & Meron Gross, Citation Prac-
tices of the Supreme Court: Quantitative Analysis, 27 MISHPATIM/HEB. U. L. REV. 119, 152, tbl.
10 (1996) (Heb.). Similar trends were found in a later study. See Yoram Shachar, The Reference
Practices of the Israeli Supreme Court 1950-2004, 50 HAPRAKLIT 29 (2008) (Heb.).
Binyamin Blum recently examined the Israeli departure from civil law as an inspirational
source. Analyzing a landmark case, he remarked that "[t~he Court completely overlooked the
experience of Continental European courts," despite the fact that many civil law jurisdictions
could serve a legitimate source because their laws address the legal problem under scrutiny.
Blum, supra note 26, at 2152.
The Americanization of Israeli law and legal education are only two examples of the way
Israeli society, politics, and culture rely on American visions. For further analysis, see, for exam-
ple, Tom SEGEv, ELVIS IN JERUSALEM: POST-ZIONISM AND THE AMERICANIZATION OF ISRAEL
(Haim Watzman trans., 2002); Uzi Rebhun & Chaim I. Waxman, The "Americanization" of
Israel: A Demographic, Cultural and Political Evaluation, 5 ISR. STUD. 65 (2000).
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A notable effect of judicial signaling, as Graeme Dinwoodie re-
marked, is the courts' explicit participation in the process of interna-
tional norm-creation and enforcement. Courts invite, interpret, and
enforce internationally recognized norms and obligations in their rul-
ings,345 in addition to offering the "interpretations of the scope of
their national laws that can easily extend their local norms into inter-
national space." 346 National courts, in other words, provide great sup-
port to global efforts in harmonizing copyright law as well as in
attracting other systems' interest to follow their doctrinal preferences
that may turn into the beginning of global norm-creation.347
By embracing the fair use model and becoming one of the four
countries in the world to do so, Israeli courts showed their openness
towards foreign and international influences. 348 In this way, Israeli
courts contribute to the possible making of fair use a global copyright
norm. Crafting a system embedded with values from different sources
shaped to comply with the needs of a young country is not an act of
weakness. It conveys social and political power, commitment to
global values, and, in the words of Haim Cohn, "the long-range legis-
lation needs of a young state ambitious to be one of the foremost
torch-bearers of an enlightened and progressive world community." 349
B. Identifying Good Signaling
The above discussion triggers several important questions. Should
other jurisdictions learn from Israel? What are the incentives to fol-
low Israel's example? Can Israel become a norm-donor and not only,
345. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Foreign and International Influences on National Copy-
right Policy: A Surprisingly Rich Picture, in 6 NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 160 (Fiona
Macmillan ed., 2007) (examining global changes in intellectual property lawmaking).
346. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The International Intellectual Property System: Treaties, Norms,
National Courts, and Private Ordering, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOP-
MENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS-PLUs ERA 61, 100
(Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007).
347. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should
Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469 (2000) (discussing both public and private creation
of international copyright law and showing the active role of courts in the design of global
norms).
348. As the former President of the Israeli Supreme Court, Aharon Barak once remarked, "I
have found comparative law to be of great assistance in realising my role as a judge. The case
law of the courts of the United States, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Germany
have helped me significantly in finding the right path to follow." Aharon Barak, Comparison in
Public Law, in JUDICIAL RECOURSE TO FOREIGN LAW: A NEw SOURCE OF INSPIRATION?, Supra
note 237, at 287, 287. On the use of comparative law by Israeli courts, see Fania Oz-Salzberger
& Eli Salzberger, The Secret German Sources of the Israeli Supreme Court, 3 ISR. STUD. 159
(1998); Ren6e Sanilevici, The Use of Comparative Law by Israeli Courts, in THE USE OF COM-
PARATIVE LAW BY COURTS, supra note 237, at 197, 197-98.
349. Haim H. Cohn, An Introduction into the Law of Israel, 5 N.Y. L. FORUM 1, 7 (1959).
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as a young state, a norm-receiver?350 In The Law of Other States, Eric
Posner and Cass Sunstein pose the question of "whether courts should
consult the laws of 'other states."' 35" In particular, they defend the
U.S. Supreme Court's frequent practice of relying on foreign law in its
efforts to provide novel interpretations of the Constitution. Applying
the Condorcet Jury Theorem, they argue that "[i]f many people have
(independently) decided that X is true, or that Y is good," then the
theory "gives us reason, under identifiable conditions, to believe that
X is true and that Y is good." 352 "Good" can also be used in the sense
of reminding courts that better solutions exist elsewhere,353 or in the
sense of acknowledging the normative value of foreign laws. As Jus-
tice Kennedy has said, "The opinion of the world community, while
not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant
confirmation for our own conclusions." 354
These remarks raise two interesting questions relating to fair use
transplantation. First, does the fact that only four signatory states to
the Berne Convention adopted the fair use system mean that is it not
as good as fair dealing systems? Second, should "older" systems con-
sult with the younger ones, such as Israel, with a relatively short expe-
rience? Posner and Sunstein correctly contend that "young states
have more to learn, and old states have more entrenched practices
that are harder to change."355 However, national and regional move-
ments for legislative and normative reforms in one relatively young
system have the capacity to ignite changes in other systems. The
change made to the standard of duration of copyrighted works-fol-
lowing the European term Directive 356-in the majority of signatory
states to international copyright treaties is an immediate good exam-
ple. The European legal system is young. Leaders of the European
Union celebrated its 50th anniversary in 2007. Although it is a union
of older civilizations, the actual corpus of European legislation-the
350. See Likhovski, supra note 148, at 651.
351. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131, 131
(2007).
352. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Response: On Learning from Others, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 1309, 1309-10 (2007). They elaborate on the application of the theorem in The Law of
Other States. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 351, at 138-46.
353. See generally Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108
YALE L.J. 1225 (1999).
354. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
355. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 351, at 173. This is perhaps one of the reasons that U.S.
courts relied on foreign law in the nineteenth century more than they do today. See Ulrich
Drobnig, Introduction, in THE USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW BY COURTs, supra note 237, at 1, 21.
356. See Council Directive, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 93/98/EEC.
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acquis-is younger than Israel. Nevertheless, it has already influ-
enced the development and revision of international copyright norms.
Adopting legal principles such as fair use without further study is
undesirable and, as Giuseppina D'Agostino asserted, "[o]ne must be
very careful when importing legal devices from other jurisdictions." 357
Young legal systems cannot provide sufficient information for a com-
prehensive study regarding their experience. But this should not un-
dervalue the contribution of younger states to influencing the
evolution and progression of norms in older systems, as well as in the
international arena. The fact that four countries adopted the U.S.-
style fair use standard and the fact that the Israeli legislature left the
impression that users' rights form an integral part of the local copy-
right polity358 show the way in which young systems may convince
other systems that adherence to certain norms is to the benefit of their
copyright community. The Israeli judicial experience also lends sup-
port to scholarly debates that may eventually lead to wide legal revi-
sions. For example, Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss argues that users'
rights should be made part of the TRIPS Agreement.359 If more
countries will embrace users' rights, similar to Israel, as part of the
very definition of copyright, the combination of the young country's
contribution and scholars' theory can yield substantive results. Fur-
thermore, accepting fair use as the standard while respecting interna-
tional norms serves as a counterargument to those who criticize fair
use doctrines for their violation of international obligations.
When young legal systems choose to follow an established doctrinal
pattern borrowed from other systems, they do not put national inter-
ests behind a mask of international consensus. They expose "unob-
servable qualities" 360 and disseminate information of alternative ways
to follow. 361 In fact, they contribute to the process necessary for cer-
tain norms to become part of the global legal agenda of copyright. If
other legal systems found that fair use is not a desirable tool, the fact
that young systems did acknowledge its value may trigger global
awareness to revisit these findings.
357. D'Agostino, supra note 145, at 359. The Singapore experience shows that the local copy-
right system suffered considerable problems because its courts demonstrate "a reluctance to
embrace fully [U.S.] fair use at the risk of causing undue confusion." Id.
358. See CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc'y of Upper Can. [2004] S.C.R. 339, 342 (Can.).
359. See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71
U. CHI. L. REv. 21 (2004).
360. Likhovski, supra note 148, at 623.
361. Logic dictates that "states should consult comparative materials because of the informa-
tion they convey, and the practices of some states are more likely to convey relevant information
than the practices of others." Posner & Sunstein, supra note 351, at 175.
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XI. CONCLUSION
Imperial British copyright law universally ended in 2007, with
Israel's final departure from the Imperial copyright model. It took
Israel almost six decades to declare the end of the model inherited
from the British Mandate. In the long absence of guidance from the
legislature, courts in Israel were expected to imbue modern life into
obsolete laws. Loaded with this task, Israeli courts kept redefining the
ideological and legal boundaries of copyright. The judicial transplan-
tation of the American fair use standard and departure from the Brit-
ish fair dealing doctrine is perhaps the court's greatest judicial
achievement in copyright.
The examples discussed show that if the general case for copyright
is an uneasy one,362 the case for fair use is no different. Courts are
expected to guide society's behavior, even when the legal tools chosen
are flexible and unpredictable. These doctrinal qualities allow courts
to address contemporary problems and maintain a balanced dialogue
between authors and users. The enacted fair use model is also a signal
to the international community that this model is desirable and com-
mensurate with global obligations and values.
The new Israeli Copyright Act and the jurisprudence of the Israeli
Supreme Court do not present an indigenous, home-grown copyright
law. Foreign legal systems had a great impact on the evolution of Is-
raeli copyright law. If one tries to purify Israeli copyright law, one is
likely to reveal the many historical and ideological layers imported
from foreign sources and grown in different constitutional climates. I
began this inquiry with the assertion that the history of copyright can
tell us many stories. The Israeli version of this story can serve as an
illuminating example to other jurisdictions, regardless of their consti-
tutional age or democratic maturity. Norman Bentwich, the High
Commissioner to Palestine, wrote in 1924 that "in the sphere of ...
civil law, Palestine will for years to come offer an unexhausted field to
the legislator and endless scope to the collector of legal problems." 363
This prediction is aptly captured by the Israeli experience with the fair
use doctrine. The Israeli experience exposed the difficulties within
fair dealing systems. It highlights why states should not cling dogmati-
cally to their fair dealing tradition, as well as the adverse results that
such practice can yield.
362. See generally Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).
363. Norman Bentwich, The Law and the Courts of Palestine, 2 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 37, 50 (1926).
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Copyright and fair use reform in Israel, whether performed by the
courts or the legislature, exemplify how history is a living phenome-
non in contemporary copyright. The fair use model that was shaped
and that matured in Israel since the inception of the state not only
plays an important role in influencing the way we think of copyright
law, but also clarifies the questions we ask about it, what we imagine is
possible, and, consequently, what we demand of copyright on fair
terms.
